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Abstract 
This study is based on the premise that sport occupies a unique and prominent position 
in Australian culture, such that it can be considered in institutional terms. Sport's 
interaction with another institution in Australian society - government, has undergone 
significant changes in the second half of the twentieth century. This changing 
relationship has had a substantial impact on sporis public policy. The purpose of this 
study is to describe and explore this relationship in greater depth by examining the case 
of the Western Australian Football Commission (the 'Commission'). 
Australian Rules Football ('Football') is the largest spectator sport in Australia and is 
Australia's major indigenous sporting innovation. It is also a reflection of larger 
dynamics in Australian society. On the one hand it is a big business, driven by 
commercial considerations and its positions of power are coveted by the rich and 
influential, and those aspiring to be so. However, its roots are firmly anchored in 
tradition, the common people, identity and rivalry. 
Despite the relative importance of sport in Australian society it remains the case that it 
has only recently began to attract serious academic attention, this situation is amplified 
even further in relation to Football. The Commission's performance has not been 
subjected to systemati(; external review, even though its decisions have a ~j:·ect impact 
on thousands of Western Australians and it has received substantial ongoing public 
funding. 
Tl.is case study will use a public policy approach to evaluate the performance of the 
Commission. It will seek to provide an answer to a question that has been prominently 
and frequently debated in the Western Australian community - has the Commission 
delivered on its range of objectives and in particular how has the public interest been 
scned by thr legacy of the government's 1989 rescue of Western Australian Football? 
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CHAPTER ONE· AUSTRALIAN SPORT AND PuBLIC POLICY 
For a few weeks in September 2000 the Australian nation was transfixed with events 
which were taking place in Sydney. It had been forty-four years since the Olympic 
games had been held in Australia at the 1amous Melbourne Cricket Ground, birthplace 
and home of Australian Rules Football. In Sydney, when the stock horses rode out into 
Stadium Australia to the music from the Man From Snowy River many Australian 
hearts were brimming with national pride, The biggest show on earth had arrived and 
against all odds it was taking place in Australia. In that moment, and in many others 
over the subsequent days, Australia ser.med a different place, a little closer, more 
tolerant and perhaps more comfortable with its history and its place in the world. The 
potential uniting power of sport was on display. The Sydney Olympic Games 
represented a pinnacle of Australian sporting achievement, an achievement based on 
strong sporting traditions and partnership with government. Sport has a unique place in 
Australian culture, in fact it has been elevated to such an extent that some have 
questioned as to whether it borders on an unhealthy obsession. It led Donald Home 
(1966, p, 22) in his 1960's account of Australian society The Lucky Country to observe, 
"sport to many Australians is life and the rest is shadow. Sport has been the one 
national institution that has no 'knockers'," 
SPORT AND AUSTRALIAN CULTURE 
Defining what it means to be Australian has never been a straightforward task. A nation 
which began as a far removed portion and dependent part of the British Empire 
transformed into a country keen to make its own way in the world and more recently to 
a multicultural, but still predominantly European nation in the Asian region of the 
world. Australia's Constitution, (notwithstanding John Howard's attempt at a preamble 
in the 1999 Republic referendum) was principally written to distribute power in a 
federal fonn of government rather than to express the identity of a new nation. Without 
the benefit of a formal national definition of what it means to be Australian a list of 
character contenders have grown to fill the vacuum. One of the most frequently stated 
and persistent of these has been the role of sport in Australian national identity. In 
addition to Donald Home's oft quoted remark about the position of sport in Australian 
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society in The Lucky Country a number of other authors-have made similarly strong 
claims. Dunstan (i973, p. 1) claimed that sport in Australia "is the ultimate super 
religion." Jobling's (1999, p. 239) institutional account of Australian sport observes 
that it is frequently described as a national religion or obsession. According to 
Cashman (1995, p. vii) "for better or worse, sport is central to the business of being 
Australian and appeals to many Australians." There are various historical reasons 
offered for the prominent role of sport in Australian society. Mandie (1973) and Jobling 
(1999) describe cricket as being an important means through which Australians proved 
their worth, particularly in the eyes of the British. The appropriately named 'test 
matches' were an important medium through which Australians could demonstrate that 
their convict origins had not prevented the development of a decent and worthy society. 
Houlihan (1997, p.26) has termed this phenomena as 'cricketing nationalism'. Home 
(1966, p. 156) comments that sport was the only means, prior to supporting the British 
in war, which Australians could utilise to prove their worthiness. Despite the eagerness 
to prove themselves against the 'old enemy', Australia's sporting traditions (as with 
many other institutions in Australian society) owe much to their British heritage. Sport 
as a means of building character and supporting notions of 'muscular christianity' were 
key themes to emerge from the influence of the English education system in early 
Australian sport (Horne, 1966, p. 105; Cashman, 1995, pp. 54-57). In addition to the 
inheritance of British values, other reasons offered for Australian interest and success in 
sport have been the climate, the amount of open space, the availability of leisure time 
and a love for physicai activity (Houlihan, 1997, pp. 26-27). 
Despite the enthusiasm displayed by many social commentators, the position of sport in 
Australian culture is not beyond criticism. Furthennore, the notion that Australian sport 
has been relatively free of class, gender and race discrimination has been significantly 
criticised (Cashman, 1995; Booth & Tatz, 2000). Australian sport has not been 
divorced from the society in which it has exisled and as a result it has reflected bolh 
desirable and undesirable elements. In other words, sport is not, as it is sometimes 
portrayed, something that always represents the good and best of human behaviour. 
However, the purpose of this work is not to debate the merits of sport's place in 
Australian culture but rather to accept that - rightly or wrongly - sport for many is 
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central to what it means to be an Australian and that this has had a demonstrable impact 
on Australian public policy. 
AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT AND SPORT 
Just as Australian society has changed considerably since federation, so too has two of 
its major institutions - government and sport. The relationship between the two has 
transformed frr:Jn mutual disinterest, through a period of reluctant courtship, leading 
finally to something of a practical, financial!politic~l partnership, perhaps given its 
ultimate expression in the Sydney Olympics. Successive governments came to 
recognise the political and social benefits that sport could offer and sport, particularly 
those sports incapable of generating sufficient revenue from the marketplace, were to 
recognise that elite performance and growth in participation could only be achieved 
through public funding. There has traditionally been a sense of unease on behalf of 
both sport and government about their relationship, perhaps best expressed in the 
maxim that politics and sport should not mix. Like many other maxims, this one is best 
left to idealists and those who cling to the amateur notions of the past. Much of sport 
today is big business and big business belongs in the politiCal big league. Furthennore, 
sport has by no means been immune from its own political machina1 iom and has 
produced some remarkable political stories in its own right. 
While the primary focus of this study is Australian public policy and sp\1rt (and in 
particular Football), it is worth noting that the growth in government involl'ement in 
sport reflects a woddwide trend, a trend which Johnson and Frey trace Uack to the mid 
1960s (1991, pp.?-9). There are various reasons offered in the literature for this global 
change in government's stance towards sports policy. Firstly, the general mcrease of 
government involvement in all policy areas throughout the twentieth century 
(Beresford, 2000, pp. 42-56; Henningham, 1999, p.4; Johnson & Frey, 1991, p.2; 
Houlihan 1991, p. 151). S(~condly, the transfonnation of elite level sport from that of an 
essentially amateur competition, organised by voluntary administrators, to a 
commercial, highly paid, business-like activity run by multi-billion dollar organisations. 
The idea of sport as a business and a form of work was resisted in Australia well into 
the twentieth century (James, 1994, p. 12). Thirdly, there has also been a chang(.. in the 
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ethical and social standing of sport. It bas shifted, pruticularly at the elite level, from 
the virtue and enjoyment of competing, to the compulsion to win and the associated 
financial rewards. Houlihan (1991, p. 5) expands on this trend by arguing that the 
blurring of the line between sport and politics provides further evidence of the demise 
of sport as representing higher aspirations and ideals. Finally, several authors such as 
Johnson & Frey (1991), Houlihan (1991 & 1997), Jobling (1999), Gratton & Taylor 
(1994) take up the argument that the increasing level of government involvement in 
sport can be explained by government recognition of the ability of sport to promote 
politically desirable outcomes such as patriotism, cohesion and national identity. 
The reasons for government funding of sport and recreation are well represented in the 
1999 report Shaping Up: A Review of Commonwealth Involvement in Sport and 
Recreation i11 Australia, which is one of the most recent major reviews of the 
Commonwealth's sport and recreation policy settings. These include: 
• Investing in the community because of sport's integral position in Australian 
culture, its historical significance and its ability to generate and maintain 
nationalist sentiment; 
• Sport's ability to foster social cohesiveness and unity; 
• The role of sport in developing young people and producing desirable qualities 
of citizenship; 
• Participation in sport and recreation activities improves individual health and 
fitness; 
• Sport promotes inclusion and brings diverse groups closer together in a multi-
cultural society; and 
• Participation in sport has been linked to reduced levels of crime and social 
dysfunction. 
Prior to the 1970's (notwithstanding the obligatory last minute rescue of the 1956 
Melbourne Olympic Games) there was relatively minor involvement by government in 
sport (Jobling, 1999, p.252; Cashman, 1995, p.l21; Annstrong, 1994, p.l88). This 
deliberate non-policy was predominantly based on the view that sport was a personal 
activity and a matte:· of individual choice about how one wanted to spend their leisure 
4 
time. In essence, it was an activity confined to the personal sphere and beyond 
legitimate government interference, a view finnly anchored in the idyllic notions of 
sport being an amateur pursuit that produced intrinsic benefits (Phillips, 1997, p. 2; 
Cashman, 1995, pp. 120-121; Armstrong, 1994, p. 188; Johnson & Frey,l991, p. 5). 
The generally held consensus revealed by the literature is that the first systematic 
attempt by any Australian government to intervene in sports policy was made by the 
Whitlam Labor government with the establishment in 1972 of the Department of 
Tourism and Recreation (Cashman, 1995, p. 123; Houlihan, 1997, p. 69). In terms of 
elite sports funding, the Whitlam government allocated$! million in its first budget tG 
assist Australian amateur athletes to participate in national and international 
competitions. Total sports funding by the Commonwealth in 1973 amounted to 5.2 
cents per capita (Jobling, 1999, p. 253). Even after allowing for inflation, the enormous 
difference in funding for athletes participating in the Sydney Olympic Games is a vivid 
reminder of how much the relationship between government and elite sport has 
changed. The election of a new Coalition federal government in late 1975 was to have 
major implications for sports policy. The Fraser government did not share its 
predecessor's commitment to federal funding for sport and preferred to leave decisions 
on sport funding allocation to state and local government, wishing to avoid the 
appearance of being a centralist, big government (Armstrong, 1994, p. 189). This 
approach was jolted, however, when the Austmlian Olympic team failed to win a gold 
medal at the 1976 Montreal Olympics. Agitation for greater government assistance to 
sport began to be heard across the political spectrum. 
The election of the Hawke Labor government in 1983 saw a return of sports policy to 
the centre of the political agenda. In its first budget the Hawke government doubled 
expenditure on sport and recreation to $50 million. Two influential reports were 
conducted in the initial years of the Hawke government; the 1983 The Way We P(l)ay: 
Commonwealth Assistance for Sport and Recreation report from the House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Expenditure and the report by the Interim 
Committee for the Australian Sports Commission (ASC) in March 1984, which laid the 
foundation for the ongoing government involvement in sport and recreation through the 
establishment of the ASC. 
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The federal policy development and elite performance enhancement structure is 
mirrored at the state level. In Western Australia, the move to bring sport and recreation 
under Ministerial responsibility was achieved in 1978 when the Youth, Sport and 
Recreation Act replaced the 1972 Youth, Community Recreation and National Fitness 
Act (Gray, 1980, p. 106). Changes in the level of public expenditure on sport and 
recreation in Western Australian also reflected the growing involvement of government 
in service provision and a growing bureat1cracy to oversee the industry. Between 
1973/?4 and 1977/78 the sport and recreation budget increased from $597,000 to 
$2,353,00 (Gray, 1980, p. 106). At the elite level, the Western Australian Institute of 
Sport was established in 1984 and in 2002 the Insti:ute employs more than 50 peopie 
and has an annual budget in excess of $5 million (V/estem Australian Parliamentary 
Debates [WAPD], 12 September 2001, p. 3617). 
The greatest ongoing policy debate about sport in Australia is how government policy 
should deal with seeking to achieve an appropriate balance between funding policies 
aimed at promoting mass participation and policies focused on elite performance. This 
policy tension is well represented in a number of major sports policy reviews at state 
and federal level, such as Bloomfield (1978), Mcl..eay (1983), Australian Sports 
Commission (i992), Oakley (1999) and the High Performance Working Group (2002). 
As Jobling (1999, p.255) states, "the issue of whether governments should promote 
'elite sport' as compared to 'sport for all' is a continuing one." Achieving a balance 
between elite development, entertainment, revenue and community participation is also 
an issue for Football administrators and a Football specific examination of this policy 
challenge is to be found in reports such as those by Tannock (1992), Fong (2000), 
Australian Football League (2001 & 2002) and MeAullay (2001). 
The Sydney Olympics provided a viv1d reminder of just how much the relationship 
,JCtween sport and government has changed in the twentieth century. The Federal 
Government keenly aware of the wide ranging benefits realisable from a successful 
p!rfonnance by the host team, boosted funding to record levels and gave priority to 
0.\ympic sports. Sport Juring the twentieth century has become increasingly 
coinmercialised and politicised, a trend that was to impact sig!lificantly on government 
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and sports administrators. Football, despite its uniqueness and reh:.tive global isolation, 
did nJt escape these seemingly irresistible forces. 
AUSTRALIAN FOOTBALL 
If sport in general has a special place in fabric of Australian society, then Football has a 
truly unique place in Australian sport. The game originated in Melbourne in the 1850s 
and spread across Australia's southern states where it is was to rapidly become the 
dominant winter sport. Football represents Australia's major indigenous sporting 
innovation and is watched by more spectators than any other sport. The 1993/94 
Australian Bur:au of Statistic's Overview of Sport and Re.._reation estimated that total 
Football attendance& were 14.4 million, the next most popular spectator sport was 
Rugby League at 8.5 million (ABS, 1997, pp. 11-12). In 2001, 6.8 million spectators 
attended AFL games (Evans, 2002). Ir. addition to Football's considerable crowd 
attendance figures there is the significant numbers of Austra1ians more closely involved 
with the game. The AFL estimates that there are 48,000 volunteers supporting 400,000 
players from 10,000 clubs across Australia (Duffield, 2002, p.3). 
Football represents as well as any other Australian sport the changes that have 
transformed sport in the twentieth century. Football in Australia, anchored in its 
suburban, tribal roots based on tradition, loyalty and identity, has moved to a fully 
professiona1 and national competition that in 2001 saw the AFL generate a record 
$116.6 million in revenue (Gough, 2002). Nadel (2000, p. 218) has observed the 
paradox between the game's roots and the recent strategies of its administrators, "the 
strategic development of the competition has oriented towards television, sponsorship, 
business supporters (see Colonial Stadium) :.md away from the traditional supporter for 
over two decades." The relationship between Football and government has varied from 
time to time and from State to State. However, two factors have had a rel~-tively 
consistent impact on the relationship between government and Football. Firstly, the 
game at the elite level is largely self-supporting, that is, it is capable of generating 
sufficient revenues from the market. This factor should reduce Football's need to seek 
or rely on government funding relative to other sports. Secondly, Football is not an 
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international sport and as a result it does not attract funding for the same reasons as 
sports played at an international level such as Olympic sports. 
A number of authors such as Jobling (1998), Phillips (1995), Houlihan (1991 & 1997) 
and Cashman (1995) have noted the relatively late arrival of sport's related academic 
research. football has tended to follow this general trend, if anything it has been 
inclined to attract even less academic attention. The academic treatment of Football is 
generally acknowledged as commencing with Leonie Sandercock and Ian Turner's Up 
Where Cazaly? The Great Australian Game (1981). This book was followed by 
Stewart's The Australian Football Business: A Spectator's Guide to the VFL (1983) and 
together they laid the foundation for a series of other works in the 1990's. The impact 
of ever growing commercialisation on Football's traditions has proved to be an 
enduring theme. Stewart and his co·editor Rob Hess were to produce the more 
comprehensive and historically focused More Than A Game, which was published in 
1998. This book has the benefit of being written after the national expansion of the 
VFL, which became the AFL in 1990. Of particular interest are Dave Nadel's chapters 
Colour, Corporations and Commissioners 1976·1985 and The League Goes National 
1986·1997. When combined with Gary Linnell's Football Ltd: 71ie Inside Story of the 
AFL, the reader is able to obtain a detailed account of the entrepreneurial inspired 
ructions that characterised the VFL throughout the 1980's. 
Of great importance were the direct ramifications for Western Australian Football, 
including the significant impact on the financial well being of the W AFL clubs arising 
from the major reduction in the VFL club's capacity to offer player transfer fees, which 
were a significant portion of theW AFL club's income (Mitchell, 1983). The VFL's 
financial problems also prompted the entry of the WCE into the VFL in 1987. This was 
to drastically and pelmanently alter the W AFL competition and provided the 
momentum that was to take the already cash strapped W AFL down the road to financial 
collapse (Linnell, 1995; Nadel, 1998). 
1 ust as the more powerful and wealthier Federal Government has come to dominate the 
public policy settings in the Australian system of government, so too did the VFUAFL 
come to dominate Australia's 'federal' football system. A point more colourfu\ly 
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depicted by Linnell (1995, p. 245) when he observed, " ... when the VFL sneezed, 
Western Australian football came down with pneumonia." As is demonstrated above, it 
is impossible to gain an understanding of developments in the policy environment for 
Western Australian Football in the 1980's without having regard to what had transpired 
in the VFL. 
WESTERN AUSTRALIAN FOOTBALL 
Football in Western Australia has its own rich traditions. According to Blainey (1990, 
p. 80) the first game of Football was played in 1868 in the grounds of the Bishop's 
Collegiate School by the visiting 14th Regiment and by the 1880s Football had 
succeeded rugby as the dominant football code. The Wes1em Australian Football 
Association was formed in 1885 and became the Western Australian Football League in 
1908. Most of the clubs participating the current W AFL competition have been in 
existence for over one hundred years. Despite Western Australia's own rich Football 
traditions, the great majority of Football's academic works have emanated from 
Victoria. This is not surprising, given the VFL's historical roots and long standing status 
as Australia's premier competitiun. A review of the literature reveals that similar works 
based on Western Australian Football are comparatively scarce, notwithstanding the 
contributions of those who have documented the histories of various leagues and clubs 
such as Christian (1985 & 1988), Spillman (1998-2000), Lee (1998) and Casey (1995). 
However, these works have in the main been written from a narrative viewpoint and 
have not sought to offer an overall perspective on the governance of the game. For the 
greater part they are detailed histories of individual Football clubs and players. 
A major change occurred in the governance of Western Australian Football in 1989 
when the Western Australian Football Commission ('W AFC' or 'the Commission') was 
established to oversee all aspects of the sport in Western Australia1• It is the review of 
this body and its relationship with the State Government that r·orms the basis of this 
study. The period since the fonnation of the WAFC, with the exception of Atwell, 
1 A detailed account of the establishment of the Commission is contained in Chapter Two. 
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Scott & Williams (1993) and Crawford2 (2001), remains unsubjected to external and 
systematic critical review. The Labor Opposition in the lead up to the 2001 State 
election promised a public inquiry into Western Australian Football (West Australian 
Labor Party - Sport and Recreation Policy, 2000). However, since obtaining 
government no inquiry has been conducted. 
Even the reviews conducted by Atwell et al. (which was a report to the Minister for 
Sport and Recreation) and Crawford were primarily concerned with the Commission's 
structural and constitutional arrangements, rather than attempts to answer broader 
questions about the quality of the Commission's governance. While there is a clear 
relationship between how a body is constituted and the policy formulation process (i.e. 
an appropriate structure maximises the possibility of obtaining effective outcomes), 
neither report explicitly answers the question of whether the Conunission has done the 
job it was intended to do, according to its range of objectives and against the 
background in which it was established. Crawford's report in particular was seen as th..! 
most important external review of the Commission since its inception. However, in 
many respects it leaves gaps in relation to some of the major questions about the 
Commission's performance. Crawford himself raises such issues when he posed the 
following: 
Whilst acknowledging the need for a strong independent Commission such 
as that which was created to ensure football interests are protected and 
advanced, there is a need for the Commission to be accountable for its 
stewardship. This raises the question of to whom is accountability owed-
government, the public, or the constituent parties involved in football 
throughout the state [emphasis added]? The question is addressed by 
recommending changes in the way Commissioners are elected, by giving 
those involved in football a greater say in those elections (2001, pp. 3-4). 
Crawford's view that the accountability question is best answered by the method of 
election of office bearers may be adequate in the context of a constitutional review 
conducted under terms of reference agreed with the Commission, but is by no means an 
answer to the broader question. However, it would be unfair to portray Crawford as 
totally non-judgemental about the overall perfonnance of the Commission. He states 
2 It is questionable as to whether Crawford's report is truly an external review (though conducted 
independently) in the sense that it was commissioned by theW AFC under its terms of reference. 
10 
that the Commission (2001, p. 1) " ... is seen to have been successful in fulfilling the 
goals and objectives that led to the formation of the Conunission, being the stabilising 
and financial restructuring of Football in Western Australia." Clearly, financial stability 
was the number one goal and the primary driver behind the establishment of the 
Commission. However, it is worth noting that the first object of the Commission 
according to its Constitution amended on 16 June, 1989 (pp. 3~7). is " to promote, 
develop, control, manage and encourage football matches and competitions in and out 
of W A with the aim of maintaining the West Australian League as an elite and 
successful competition." The second object is "to provide guidance, planning, control 
and leadership to the football industry and for the benefit of the public." Against the 
background of these objectives3, any overall critical review of the performance of the 
Commission should take a broader view than financial stability alone. 
Notwithstanding the efforts of Atwell et al. and Crawford, by far the most prolific 
reviewer of the policy direction of Western Australian Football has been the 
Commission itself, with a series of major reports, including Tannock (1992 & 1995), 
Gloede (1994), Fong (2000) and McAullay (2001). Tannock, Fong and Gloede were 
primarily concerned with what has remained as the Commission's most persistent 
challenge - how the W AFL (which was called Westar Rules between 1997 and 2000) 
should be structured, it<: avpropriate place in the Western Australian Football market 
place and its role in the player development pathway? The reports prepared for the 
Commission should ~tot be subject to criticism for failing to deal with issues outside 
their intended scope and it should be emphasised that they were predominantly prepared 
as intemal Commission documents for the Football industry. Clearly, the Commission 
has sought to regularly review its direction and this would be expected of an 
organisation with the Commission's responsibilities. 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that from time to time the Commission has been placed 
under significant scrutiny by the media. The West Australian newspaper in particular 
has provided significant coverage of Football governance issues through sports 
3 These two objectives are considered to be the most suitable basis on which to evaluate the 
Commission's performance. The 1997 W AFC Annual Report contains a more recently developed 
mission statement, principal objectives and divisional goals and achievements. While offering value to 
this study, these are considered to be of lesser significance than those contained in the Constitution. 
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journalists such as Mark Duffield, John McGrath, and Bevan Eakins. Without 
reviewing the contents and quality of each of the numerous articles produced by these 
writers, there is a need to provide an overall comment on the shortcomings of relying on 
media reports as an effective means of external review of the totality of the 
Commission's performance. Again, as with the Commission's own reports, the 
deficiencies arise largely from the purpose and perspective from which the literatt,re is 
produced. Newspaper reports are intended to convey a story, attract interest, gather 
comment and offer opinions. Such reports do not offer a comprehensive review over a 
period of time and often fail to evaluate the subject of the report against any stated 
criteria or perspective. They provide useful and informative snapshots, but they do not 
satisfy the rigorous and systematic approach required of academic inquiry. 
It remains the case that apart from periodic interjections by those in the political sphere 
the literature reveals an absence of a critical public policy based review of the 
Commission's performance. This lack of systematic external review has occurred 
Cespite a period of substantial change in Western Australian Football. Clearly, the 
Commission has sought to evaluate its own direction, but self~analysis is a poor 
substitute if legitimate public interest issues exist. The core question is whether the 
Commis;::ion is (or should be) in any substantial sense publicly accountable? If the 
Commission is viewed as a body which is essentially nothing more than a private 
business owner (it is the owner and licence holder of two large businesses -the WCE 
and FPC) then there is a very marginal case to argue that the Commission should be in 
any sense a publicly accountable institution. It is of course, in a narrow sense 
accountable to its constituents- members of the Football industry, but is not in any 
formal way responsible to the Minster for Sport (or if it were a statutory authority to the 
Parliament). However, such a narrow view ignores several key factors that provide a 
basis for arguing that a legitimate public interest in the Commission's performance does 
exist. These are: 
• The Commission was established with assistance from public funds; 
• The Government was heavily influential in the development of the 
Commission's constitution and membership; 
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111 The Commission continues to receive substantial ongoing support from tax 
payers through the contribution of funds to areas such as the Football 
Development Trust and the redevelopment of Subiaco Oval; 
• The Commission's first objective calls upon it to maintain the elite statu1; of a 
competition (the W AFL) that has a long tradition and strong attachment to the 
Western Australian community. Its second objective requires it to govern 
football for the public benefit; 
, Football has achieved and maintained its status because of public support. 
Without the interest, participation and expenditure of the public, Football would 
cease to exist as we have come to know it; and 
• Football extends far wider and deeper into the community than the elite AFL 
competition and theW AFL. For the greater part it is a sport that takes place in 
suburbs and country towns. It covers hundreds of senior and junior clubs, their 
players and volunteers. According to Fang (2000, p.4), "we. cannot over 
emphasise the strong links that football creates with all facets within society." 
Football is a major part of the Western Australian community. Decisions by the 
Commission, the-refore, can have wide ranging ramifications that go beyond the 
mere conduct of the game. 
For the reasons stated above, the Commission is a social institution worthy of scholarly 
investigation and the Western Australi:m community is entitled to ask about how the 
Commission has performed in relation to its objectives and its broader public 
obligations. 
PROBLEMIQUESTION!PURPOSE 
Analysis of government decision-making is a critical component of the Australian 
political system, given that political institutions have a significant influence on the 
things we share and value (Capling, Considine & Crozier, 1998, p. 1). Decisions 
regarding the allocation of resources in society are a reflection of the competition 
between ideafl, interests and ideologies that comprise our political culture.(Bridgman & 
Davis 2000). In simple tenns, what governments choose to do or not to do fonns an 
important part of the society we live in. According to Bareham, Stokes & Hall (2000, 
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p.ll) the critical analysis of Australian politics requires attention to be given to at least 
three areas: 
o The political ideas and discourse used in advocating or resisting a course of political 
action; 
• The institutions (public or private) or organisational means through which such 
ideas and values are pursued; and 
• The policies by which such institutions are intended to operate and bring 
government's goals to fruition. 
The justification for this study revolves around the requirement that critical analysis of 
the type described above is an essential part of understanding the political system. The 
decision by the State Government to rescue Football in Western Australia and its 
insistence upon certain conditions being attached to that rescue has had significant 
implications for a large part of the community. Despite Football's significance in 
West~m Australian culture, there has been an absence of systematic evaluation of the 
policy making institution established with the support of the govemment- the WAFC. 
Even though the Commission has no formal statutory relationship with government 
there are strong grounds on which to justify that there is a legitimate public interest in 
the Commission's performance. The public interest basis of the State Government's 
contribution to Western Australian Football has been acknowledged by the 
Commission. The Commission's Chief Executive Officer, Jeff Ovens, stated the 
following the WAFC's 2000 Annual Report: 
The contribution made by the State Government, not only towards the 
support of Subiaco Oval redevelopment ($1.5 million p.a. for 20 years) but 
also in respect of junior development and country football, is much 
appreciated. It would be easy to take Government support for granted in 
respect of these matters but we know that its support is given on the basis of 
making a meaningful contribution to the quality of life of all Western 
Australians and in this case through one of the most popular sports available 
(W AFC, 2000, p.7). 
The following excerpt from a statement made by the then leader of the Opposition, now 
Premier, Geoff Gallop in Parliament on the 15 June 2000, gives an indication of the 
potential issues: 
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We all need to acknowledge that football in Western Australia is at the 
crossroads .... Like many other modem institutions, our football authorities 
have put moneymaking ahead of people and their beliefs. They have 
forgotten the difference between corpor:..te support and corporate control of 
football. Football is a people's game- our national game. It needs more 
than just spectators; it needs commitment.. .. We need a major review of 
W A football that will look at, among other things, player development, the 
Westar competition, community based football generally and the future of 
the Eagles and Dockers 0/{ APD, 15 June 2000, p.7705). 
Since attaining government there has been no major public review. The aim of this 
study is to attempt to answer some of the questions posed by the Premier by delivering a 
public policy based evaluation of the Commission's performance. It is important to 
adopt such a frame of reference to avoid the political opportunism, nearsightedness and 
interest promotion that has characterised much of the public comment on the 
Commission's performance. The study is based on the following proposed research 
questions: 
1. Has the Commission succeeded in fulfilling the major policy objectives for 
which it was established? Namely: 
~ The return to financial stability of the Western Australian Football system; 
and 
• The transferral of control over Football from the W AFL clubs to an 
independent body. 
2. Has the Commission met its primary objectives (as defined in its Constitution-
refer to page 1 0) regarding the governance of Football in Western Australia? 
3. Has government support for the Commission served the public interest'f 
METHODOLOGY 
This is an exploratory descriptive case study, which utilises qualitative research 
methods. Rist (2000, pp. 1001M1017) discusses the use of qualitative research to 
4 What constitutes the 'public interest' is contestable. The use of the term here is consistent with that 
proposed by Ryan, Parker & Hutchings (1999, p.298). "The public interest is associated with the interests 
of the community as a whole ir.cluding social cohesion and provision of public amenities and cultural 
facilities." 
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evaluate policy accountability, impacts and outcomes and his comments go to the very 
nature of this study. 
When a program reaches the stage that it is appropriate to discuss and assess 
impacts, qualitative research provides a window on the program that is 
simply not available in any other way. Qualitative research allows for the 
study of both anticipated and unanticipated outcomes, changes in 
understandings and perceptions as a result of efforts of the program or 
policy and the strengths and weaknesses of the 
administrative/organizational stl1Jcture that was used to operationalize the 
program (2000, p.I009). 
It is acknowledged that case study is not a methodological choice but rather a choice 
about what is to be studied. Punch (1998, p. 150) describes the case study approach as 
follows: 
The basic idea is that one small case (or perhaps a small number of cases) 
will be studied in detail, using whatever methods seem appropriate. While 
there may be a variety of specific purposes and research questions, the 
general objective is to develop as full an understanding of that case as 
possible. 
Grigsby (2002, pp. 16~18) offers a discussion of the case study approach as a method of 
thinking scientifically about politics. According to Grigsby, case studies have a number 
of benefits over other research approaches, the major advantage being the ability to 
provide a thoroughly in-depth analysis and provide rich detail in relation to the subject. 
Despite the limitations of non-generalisability and time-bound limitations, Grigsby 
concludes that case studies can 'provide fascinating information'. The purpose of this 
study is to provide such detail in relation to theW AFC. 
The study relies upon documentation as its chief source of data. Punch (1998, p. 190) 
recognises the relevance of documentary data: 
Documents, both historical and contemporary, are a rich source of data for 
social research. A distinguishing feature of our society may well be the vast 
array of 'documentary evidence' which is routinely compiled and retained, 
yet much of this is neglected by researchers, perhaps because the collection 
of other sorts of social data has become more fashionable. 
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The primary source of documentation is the Commission itself, which has produced a 
number of important policy reviews in the form of major reports. These documents, in 
combination with those produced by the State Government (including Hansard 
records), provide the basis of the primary sources. All significant reports produced by 
the Commission up to and including the year 2001 have been analysed in this study. In 
addition, a number of secondary sources, such as AFL publications, books, journal 
articles, government reports and newspaper articles were also reviewed and analysed. 
The documentation was analysed according to its relationship with the policy phases of 
the Commission's existence and its objectives. Many of the individuals associated with 
the writing of the key Commission documents analysed in this study were available for 
interview. This helped to overcome the issue raised by Hodder (2000, pp. 703-714) 
where he describes the difficulties in interpreting written texts that are separated in time 
and space from the authors. 
Semi-structured interviews (see Appendix One for the schedule of interviews and 
Appendix Two for sample interview questions) are employed to add additional 
information, fill gaps in knowledge and provide an additional perspective to the 
documentary evidence. For a discussion of utilising interviews for this and related 
purposes see Fontana & Frey (2000), Silverman (2000), and Punch (1998 & 2000). 
This study utilises the principles underlying Denzin's triangulation framework, which 
provides for the checking of documentary sources to reduce the likelihood of 
misinterpretation. McDonald and Tipton (cited in Punch, 1998, p. 191) stress the 
importance of "checking from more than one angle" in documentary research and that 
"nothing can be taken for granted". To be considered for inclusion in interviews, 
potential subjects must have had a close association with the establishment of the 
Commission, have been or are involved in its operation at a senior level, or have had a 
senior involvement in West Australian Football. 
There is a need to provide additional commentary on the public policy methodology 
utilised in this study. This is somewhat problematic as the definition of public policy as 
a spec!fic field of inquiry is elusive. This has been noted by a number of authors 
(Beresford, 2000; BridgmM & Davis, 2000; Co1ebatch, 2002; Woodward, Parkin & 
Summers, 1997; Fenna, 1998). According to Beresford (2000, p. 3), "at its simplest 
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level, policy is all the things that governments choose to do and not to do." According 
to Fenna (1998, p. 3) public policy is about what governments do, why and with what 
consequences. Woodward, Parkin & Summers (1997, p.415) state, "the expression 
public policy is often used as a general tenn denoting the purpose, substance and effect 
of governmental action." Grigsby (2002, p. 10) describes public policy as a sub-field in 
political science that is concerned with "studying how laws, regulations, and other 
polices are formulated, implemented, and evaluated." The public policy methodology 
utilised in this study is simply asking the question as to whether the policy aims (stated 
or otherwise) and objectives of the Western Australian State Government and the 
WAFC have been met. It aims to analyse the long term impact of a government policy 
decision by evaluating the performance of an institution that is both a product of that 
decision and a policy making institution in its own right. This methodology is described 
by Bareham, Stokes & Hall (2000, p.l2) as internal critique, that is, it involves an 
analysis of a policy and an institution against the "criteria, values or assumptions that 
they would accept as applicable or valid". Typical questions that arise from such an 
approach are: 
• What did governments (or any institution, agency or actor) plan to do, and did they 
achieve their goals? 
• What did governments (or any institution, agency or actor) say they had done, and 
did they do it? 
These types of questions closely resemble those on which this study is based. This 
method accepts the stated policy goals and objectives of the research subject and seeks 
to locate data that will either support or question whether these have been &chieved. 
The focus on objectives is consistent with one of Colebatch's assumptions about social 
order and the idea of policy. According to Colebatch (2002, p.8): 
The first assumption is instrumerltality: that organization in general, and 
public organization in particular, is to be understood as a device for the 
pursuit of particular purposes. We understand an organization by asking 
'what are its objectives?', and a successfUl organization is one which 
achieves its objectives. 
18 
This study does not attempt analysis of the kind that Bareham, Stokes & Hall (2000, p. 
13) categorise as 'external critique'. "External critique is driven by the critic's 
attachment to criteria, values or assumptions that are largely external to, or independent 
of the topic of study or the 'object' of the critique." This study does not evaluate the 
Commi:;:sion by comnaring it to :m 'ideal' set of criteria based on how such a body5 
should conduct it" :~irs. Although there is arguably a great deal of merit to such an 
approach and the development of such criteria would form a useful study in its own 
right, such an approach is beyond the resource and time limitations of this study. The 
temptation to strictly utilise a 'model of good government' such as those proposed by 
Beresford (2000) and Crawford (1996) as a basis for evaluating the Commission's 
performance has therefore been resisted tvr this study, with the acknowledgment that 
their application is worthy of further future investigation. However, elements of 
Beresford's (2000, pp. 22M35) components of good government (political leadership, 
strong revenue base, the need for preventative approaches, strategic planning and 
consultation) are utilised in the evaluation of the objectives under review in this study 
and feature in the findings presented in Chapter Five. In summary, this study is about 
developing an in depth understanding of a government policy decision -that is, why the 
Government intervened to rescue Western Australian Football. The substance of those 
actions - what it did or did not do, and the effect of that policy decision - what have 
been the consequences of the Western Australian Government's involvement for both 
the public interest and the Football industry? 
The chapter structure of this thesis has been designed to breakdown the Commission's 
existence into distinct periods, consistent with the policy challenges faced by the 
Commission in those eras. Chapter Two will focus on events directly leading up to the 
establishment of the Commission, its actual formation and the initial years of its 
operation up to the point where financial stability of Football in Western Australian had 
been achieved. Chapter Three will examine a period of consolidation in the 
Commission's history and the critical strategic decisions that were taken during this 
s The question of exactly what sort of 'body' the Commission is complicates decisions in relation to the 
criteria or model of governance on which this study should be based. That is, it is not accurately 
classifl¢<1 under such labels as public, private, not for profit, statutory authority, corporation, board of 
directors, government or an association. It shares many of the characteristics commonly associated with a 
number of these organisational classifications. 
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period. Chapter Four covers the impact of the major decisions described in Chapter 
Three and details the basis of the growing discontent with the Corrm.lission and how this 
discontent was to ultimately manifest itself. Chapter Five presents the study's findings. 
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CHAPTER TWO- BIG MONEY AND FOOTBALL 
The decade that was the 1980s is often remembered for the emergence of high profile 
entrepreneurs, many of who became household names in Australian society. Individuals 
such as Alan Bond, Christopher Skase, Lindsay Fox, Bob Ansett and John Elliott not 
only shared notoriety for their business ventures (and later, in some cases their 
significant losses) but also were prominently involved with Football. According to 
Nadel (1998, p.220) "the '/alues of the 1980s could also be seen in the changing 
organisation of football. Football executives spoke the language of marketing and 
corporate management, as did the innumerable reports they wrote or commissioned." 
The entrepreneurial business culture of the 1980s was to further accelerate the 
commercialisation and corpvrati.sati0n of the game that had emerged in the VFL in the 
1970s. The direct involvement of corporate identities in Football can be seen as both a 
cause and result of the changes that were taking place in Australia's sporting market 
place. The pressures caused by rapid cost escalation and the ever-increasing need to 
produce more revenue, has created a cycle that has proved to be an enduring feature of 
elite Football. The desire by the VFUAFL to operate a competition based or a level 
playing field (that is, the entrenched wealthiest clubs don't always win the premiership) 
has been a constant struggle. 
THE RACE TO BUY THE PREMIERSHIP 
In 1972, the VFL decided to grant all players that had accumulated ten years service a 
free transfer. This short lived mle allowed such players to place themselves on the 
'open' transfer market and invite bids from other clubs for their services. The result 
was an unprecedented bidding war that led to a number of experienced players shifting 
clubs (Ross, 1996, p. 260). Realising the potential for such a system to lead to an 
unsustainable cost escalation, the VFL quickly moved to change the rules, but not 
before the North Melbourne Football Club had pounced. North Melbourne 
administrators Ron Joseph and Allen Aylett (a future VFL President) recruited 'super 
coach' Ron Barassi and a host of experienced players from other VFL clubs and 
talented players interstate. In a short time, North Melbourne has transfonned from 
mediocrity to a premiership team, winning the Grand Final in 1975. A high degree of 
significance has been attached to North Melbourne's formula for success. The formula 
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embraced a new degree of professionalism, based on luring the best players through 
higher transfer fees and increased match payments payment to players, together with a 
move towards creating full time footballers. To be able to financially sustain their 
strategy North Melbourne had to significantly grow its revenues and this it did by 
generating funds from what at that time were non-traditional sources such as business 
sponsorships and membership services. Between 1968 and 1974, North Melbourne's 
annual revenues increased from $65,000 to $274,000 and were used to offset the 
estimated $1 million it cost to win the 1975 premiership (Stewart, 1998, pp. 197-198; 
Ross, 1996, p.272). Stewart (1998, p. 198) summarises the impact of , ·.:th 
Melbourne's strategy on the VFL as follows: 
This transformation had an impact on other clubs, who could see the results 
of expanding their revenue base and offering players inflated match 
pa~fments. But it also meant that clubs with few resources such as Fitzroy 
and South Melbourne were left further behind in the bidding race for 
players. 
The race to 'buy' premierships was on and so was the cycle of cost escalation that was 
to take most VFL clubs to the verge of insolvency by the early 1980's. VFL clubs 
needed to raise funds in order to afford talented players, players realising their new 
found bargaining power played clubs against one another to inflate their worth and 
clubs were increasingly forced to seek assistance from the corporate world ir. order to 
generate sufficient funds. In 1978, the average annual earnings of a VFL player were 
$6,000; by 1981 this had doubled to $12,000 (Stewmt, 1983, p.l29). This cycle 
produced a number of direct effects on the VFL, and as will be examined later, had a 
major impact on other competitions, including theW AFL. Notable direct effects on the 
VFL were the entry of the entrepreneurs (the corporate white knights) and a rapid 
exacerbation of the already exis~ing gulf between the haves and have-nots of the VFL 
clubs. As Stewart (1998, p.198) has observed above, not all clubs had the same ability 
to access the additional resources now needed to field a competitive team. However, 
this did not necessarily stop those who could not do so from trying and as a 
consequence there was a massive increase in the debt level of VFL clubs. The 1984 
M.::K.insey Report, commissioned by the VFL, revealed that the VFL's operating 
expenses were exceeding operating revenues by nearly $2 million per annum and that 
six of the twelve clubs were technically bankrupt (Nadel, 1998, p.220). 
22 
By 1984 it had become clear to the VFL that the competition was unsustainable in its 
current fonn and that major change was required. The question confronting VFL 
administrators was what form the change should take. Amid these considerations an 
ideological battle was taking place between the leaders of the haves and have-nots VFL 
clubs. The haves, embodied in the person of Carlton President John Elliot, were 
growing tired of competing in a 'socialist' competition, in which the wealthiest clubs 
were both subsiclising and being held back by the poorer clubs. Elliott's favoured 
'market' solution was to open up the VFL to interstate competition and jettison the 
poorer VFL clubs -let the strong survive. The have-nots argued that their presence was 
essential to continuing the traditions and fabric of the game and that the VFL ought to 
take measures to de-escalate the cost increases and establish a more even basis for the 
competition. It had become obvious that the control of the game could not remaia in the 
hands of those who represented their individual football clubs. 
In October 1984, the second report of the VFL Task Force formed in the wake of the 
McKinsey Report, recommended among other things, that " .... a five member 
commission be set up to independently run the game and free up conflict of interest" 
(Linnell, 1998, p. 83). The idea of a commission type structure was not new, for 
example, the 1983 Mitchell Report on the WAFL competition had recommended that a 
similar structure be established to govern Western Australian Football. The ne\vly 
formed VFL Commission set about establishing a strategy for the future structure of the 
competition, which revolved around three core components. Firstly, an expansion of the 
competition to introduce interstate teams, the initial conditions of which gave an 
indication that the emphasis was on raising revenue rather than a commitment to a truly 
national competition. This was to change over time. Secondly, to implement measures 
to reign in costs and reduce inequities amongst VFL clubs. These included the 
introduction of a salary cap, a national draft and limits on player lists (then 50, now 35). 
The third component of the strategy was to rationalise the number of Melbourne based 
clubs by offering incentives for teams to merge and encouraging the sharing of 
facilities, such as football grounds (Nadel, 2000, pp. 132-138). The argument over what 
should be the appropriate number of AFL clubs located in Melbourne continues to this 
day. However, apart from the relocation of South Melbourne to Sydney in 1982 and the 
merger of the Brisbane Bears and Fitzroy in 1996, the Melbourne based clubs have 
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proved to be remarkably resilient (as have their W AFL equivalents), despite the fact that 
there have been a number of 'very near things' in relation to mergers and bankruptcy. 
TOWARDS A 'NATIONAL' COMPETITION 
The VFL Commission's decision to admit two interstate teams into the competition for 
the 1987 season was to have a profound impact on the VFL and WAFL. The price of 
admission was an up front licence fee of $4 million, paid by each of the new teams- the 
West Coast Eagles from Western Australia and the Brisbane Bears from Queensland. 
While there has been a great deal of speculation, typically based upon parochial lines, 
about who saved whom by expanding the VFL competition, any objective review of the 
status of both th·~ VFL and W AFL competitions reveals that such an expansion was 
inevitable if both competitions were tG • : .. ·in viable. In particular, the typically 
Western Australian claim that the WAFL was in 'good shape' prior to the introduction 
of the WCE is highly dubious at best. 
As has already been mentioned theW AFL competition has its own rich traditions and 
has been responsible for producing some of Football's greatest players. At various 
times it could lay claim to being the premier Football state in Australia, such as in 1977 
when in the first State of Origin game the Western Australian team convincingly beat 
the Victorian team at Subiaco Oval. Although it is notoriously difficult to resolve 
arguments about the relative qualities of competitions and players across various eras, 
there is a strong argument that theW AFL was experiencing one of its peaks in the late 
1970s and early 1980's. Mitchell (1983, p.l) quotes a Victorian newspaper's 
assessment that ranked the top 40 players in the VFL in the year 1983 - 24 of which 
were Western Australians. It so happened that this peak coincided with the 'open 
cheque book' approach to recruitment taking place in the VFL, As a consequence there 
was a rapid explosion in the transfer fees paid for Western Australian players and 
W AFL clubs reaped the benefits, even if it meant the best players from the W AFL 
competition were being siphoned off every year to the VFL, For example, Stewart 
(1983) estimated that when Gary Sidebottom transferred from his W AFL club Swan 
Districts to VFL Club St Kilda in 1977 the transfer fee was $40,000. Five years later 
when Subiaco player Gary Buckenara transferred to Hawthorn, the fee was $120,000. 
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The move to the VFL was the accepted career path and the majority of Western 
Australia's talented players were willing to pursue such opportunities to play in the 
highest standard competition in Australia and receive the higher rewards on offer for 
doing so. 
The downside to the rapid increase in transfer fees being paid by VFL clubs to W AFL 
clubs was the ever growing reliance by WAFL clubs on such fees. Mitchell (1983) 
made the following observation, "operating deficits of the 8 league clubs as at 31 
October 1982 was $318,747 and at 31 October 1983 was $251,603 ,,, without transfer 
fees the 1983 loss would have been $1, 543, 033. This situation is set to continue." If 
transfer fees were removed from the incomes of WAFL clubs in the period 1978~1983 
the operating loss for that period would have been $3, 834, 000. However, it was not 
only the masking effect of the VFL's inflated transfer fees that was flowing on to 
Western Australian Football. The increased player payments in the VFL also raised 
payments to WAFL players by placing pressure on W AFL club administrators to retain 
players. According to Mitchell (1983) the VFL's 'lack of discipline' was having the 
same effects on the overall health of the W AFL as it was in the VFL itself, albeit on a 
lesser scale. The plight of the WAFL in 1983 led to an approach to the State 
Government, then led by Premier Brian Burke, for financial assistance. Mitchell's 
inquiry was conducted in response to this request and it concluded that three 
fundamental issues needed to be addressed: 
• Structural changes were needed in the direction and administration of Football; 
• There needed to be a rationalisation of grounds and increased facility sharing 
among W AFL clubs; and 
• Amendments should be made to liquor and gaming laws in order to permit 
clubs to raise grater revenues from their licenced facilities. 
The first two recommendations almost mirror those that would be made in relation to 
the VFL competition the following year. A major change to result from the Mitchell 
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Report was the establishment of a new Independent Board of the W AFL 1• The Board 
comprised Roy Annear, Peter Fogarty, Richard Colless, Tom Stannage and Dwane 
Buckland. The President of the WAFL, Vince Yovich and Bill Mitchell were also 
added to the Board which was established in Febmary 1984 (Nadel, 2000, pp. 163-170). 
Despite such changes, the irresistible forces in the Football market place meant that a 
far more radical transformation of Western Australian Football would be required to 
secure its financial future. When the VFL's capacity to pay high transfer fees ceased iu 
the mid-1980s and in the face of declining attendances in its own league the WAFL was 
left with little option but to apply for licence to enter the expanded VFL (W AFL, 1988, 
pp. 6-7). To not do so risked having to endure an intolerable waiting period before 
accessing the benefits available from participating in the elite competition. It also 
risked the prospect of allowing other potential licence applicants that were not under the 
control of theW AFL to gain entry. 
The strategy of securing a place for a Western Australian team in a national competition 
was pursued by the WAFL throughout the Illid-1980s. By 1986 the VFL had come to 
the ~iew that a national expansion was in its own best interest and although the 
proposed conditions for the competition did not represent the W AFL's preferred model, 
the combination of circumstances meant the WAFL had very little choice but to accept 
entry on the VFL's t01ms (Nadel, 2000, pp. 174-180; WAFL, 1988, p. 8). The entry of 
the WCE into the VFL in 1987 resulted in a permanent change to the W AFL 
competition. According to the WAFL (1988, p. 16) "the impact of VFL football in 
Westem Australia as a result of the advent of the Eagles has been significant and 
greatest on the W AFL and its member clubs, more so than on other elements of the 
football industry in this State." After a hundred years of being the elite Football 
competition in Western Australia, the W AFL was suddenly confined to a lesser 
position. A point recognised in the Fang Report (2000, p.4), "there is also a common 
view that the Westar Competition will never recover its halcyon days prior to the 
introduction of the AFL national competition." Even though the WAFL clubs 
1 The Board did not prove to be 'independent' enough forth,~ State Government in 1988/89 who were still 
firmly convinced that an appropriate structure did not exist ior the proper governance of Westem 
Australian Football {Edwards, 11 July 2002) - refer to changes ;o the W AFL Inc. Constitution later in 
this chapter. TheW AFL clubs had the power to nominate, vote and replace Directors on the Independent 
Board (WAFL, 1988, p. 39) (Tannock, 2 September 2002). 
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recognised the potential for such a negative impact from the entry of the WCE into the 
national competition there was also an appreciation of the ramifications of not joining 
the expanded VFL competition. 
By agreeing to apply for a licence from the VFL, the W AFL clubs were endeavouring to 
achieve two major outcomes; firstly to prevent the player drain to the east and secondly 
to benefit from the expected royalties that the WCE would generate (Nadel, 1998, p. 
230; Linnell, 1995, p.248). While a two-year momtorium on recruitment of Western 
Australian players and subsequent draft concessions granted to the WCE may have seen 
the first outcome secured in the short term, unfortunately for the W AFL the anticipated 
revenues from the WCE did not materialise. The W AFL had secured access to a 
national competition that was not based on its preferred model. Instead the W AFL 
entered an expanded VFL (which was run as such) ahead of other potential rivals and 
the South Australians who would not enter at the time because of the VFL's conditions. 
According to the W AFL' s 1988 Review ·of Future Structural Needs of Westem 
Australian Football the Western Australian Football system was ill prepared as a result 
of the haste to enter the expanded VFL. 
The W AFL's decision to join the expanded VFL competition in 1987, 
whilst considered reasonable and appropriate at the time by the majority of 
the relevant WAFL decision makers, was probably premature in a strategic 
sense by one year or possibly longer. The opportunity by virtue of a joint 
abstention of theW AFL and the SANFL from entering the VFL competition 
in 1987 to establish if the VFL would contract the number of Melbourne 
based clubs and modify certain of its requirements for entry to its expanded 
competition was lost. The cause of a more acceptably structured 
national competition was put back at least two years (W AFL, 1988, p. 8). 
In 1986 theW AFL Inc. and its clubs were still burdened by excessive debt and revenues 
were not keeping pace with rising costs - little had changed since the Mitchell Report in 
1983. Under such circumstances tile WAFL was faced with the problem of how to raise 
an additional $4 million for the WCE's licence fee and at the same tirrte convince 
concerned W AFL clubs that royalti~s generated by the WCE would offset any reduction 
in revenues. The strategy (with litde option) was to essentially place all the eggs in one 
basket- the WCE. Capital to fund the licence fee and establishment costs of the WCE 
was to be raised via the public float of a company to be known as Indian Pacific 
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Limited. IPL would be granted a sub-licence by the W AFL Inc., in return for which 
IPL would make royalty payments to theW AFL Inc. The responsibilities placed on IPL 
were by any realistic assessment highly onerous. IPL had to undertake a successful 
capital subscription, pay $4 million up front to assist in the stabilisation of the VFL, 
assemble and fund a new Football team (which realistically was an additional $10 
million), deal with a set of rules imposed by a VFL fearful of the WCE's impact on the 
competition, and to drag the W AFL Inc. and its clubs out of debt. In addition to 
meeting the above challenges, IPL also faced the extra burden of having to achieve 
these goals within a very short time frame. This perhaps unrealistically optimistic 
strategy was to unravel almost from the outset. The float of IPL was significantly under 
subscribed and as a result instead of being a 'mums and dads' company it relied on five 
individual investors, each of who contributed $1 million each (Nadel, 1998, p. 230). 
The share holding concentration was to prove highly influential in future negotiations 
by theW AFC to buy back all shares in IPL. 
Despite the relative on field success of the WCE in 1987 and 1988 (the WCE made the 
final five in 1988 which was a remarkable achievement under the circumstances), the 
overall revenue available to the W AFL Inc. actually declined -- in other words th6 
revenue pie did not grow sufficiently. A report prepared by the WAFL Inc. in 1988 
titled Future For Football in WA concluded that the WCB had in fact caused theW AFL 
to make more losses due to lower revenues, reduced television coverage and higher tha~ 
expected establishment costs incurred by IPL. IPL's royalties were simply not sufficient 
to allow the W AFL Inc. to operate on a profitable basis, especially given the pre-
existing level of indebtedness faced by the W AFL Inc. and its clubs (yY AFL, 1988, p. 
2). The same report concluded that Football in Western Australia experienced a $3.2 
million loss in 1987 and even after the offsetting effect of royalties and interest, the loss 
still amounted to $1.9 million. The budgeted loss for 1988 was $4.5 million (WAFL, 
1988, p.l1). TheW AFL Inc. had reached the point oi no return, the strategy of a WCE 
driven rescue had not eventuated and had in fact further exacerbated the situation. 
Realising that it was no longer in a position to facilitate its own recovery, the WAFL 
Inc. turned to a long time supporter and the only body which was in a position to render 
assistance- the Western Australian Government. 
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THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMISSION 
There has been a lengthy record of Government support for Football in Western 
Australia and theW AFL's request for additional assistance in 1988/89 should be placed 
in this context. An indication of the level of financial support prior to the establishment 
of the Commission is contained in response to a question in the Legislative Council in 
October 1989. The Minister for Sport and Recreation, Graham Edwards revealed that 
the State Government had contributed $3.45 million to the W AFL Inc. over the five 
year period 1984/85- 1988/89 \'N APD, 31 October 1989, pp. 4064- 4066). The level 
of support was also detailed in a report prepared by Exchequer Corporation Limited for 
Cabinet consideration in 1988. It identified that the Government was supporting the 
WAFL Inc. with a treasurer's letter of surety to the Rural & Industry Bank (now the 
privately owned Bankwest, but then 100 percent publicly owned) and the Town & 
Country Building Society for $3.25 million, payment of all capital, interest and 
operating costs of Subiaco Oval ($450,000 per annum) and $80,000 per annum to the 
Football Development Trust. It should also be emphasised that because of the 
Government's exposure, via the Rural & Industry Bank (the R & I Bank), it was also a 
major creditor faced with the proposition of not being able to recover a sizeable debt. 
The Government's long term status as the major lender to Western Australian Football 
gave it even greater grounds for playing a prominent role in any restructure (Nadel, 
2000, p. 163). The WAFL Inc. and the WAFL clubs as at the 31 October 1988 had a 
total debt of $8,501,0002 of which$ 6,372,0003 was owed to the R & I Bank (Mullin, 
1989, p.2). According to Mullin (1989, p.4): 
Since the R & I Bank potentially has the greatest exposure to loss if: 1 viable 
solution cannot be found to the financial problems of football in · Nestem 
Australia, it seems appropriate that some form of funding be sought from 
Government, on a basis that is financially feasible. 
2 Peter Metropolis (President of W AFL club Subiaco) has argued that most of this debt had been created 
by the WCE (IPL) and not theW AFL clubs (Metropolis, 12 August 2002). In any event it was a debt the 
Western Australian Football system had to bear. 
3 According to a former Commission member, interest on the WAFL Inc.'s debt was accruing at 24% 
with no prospect of repaying principal or interest (Ovens, July 3 2002). 
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The direct and indirect assistance by local and state government to Football in Western 
Australia of course extends back much further than that detailed above. However, the 
support in the period immediate prior to the establishment of the Commission provides 
a context directly applicable to the policy environment at the time of the Government's 
decision. It is interesting to reflect on the policy environment at that time, given that it 
was abundantly clear that without increased government assistance Western Australian 
Football would face ruin. In a very real sense the question was not so much whether 
government should intervene to rescue Football (it would have been politically suicidal 
for any Western Australian government to sit back and allow Football in Western 
Australian to self-destruct) but rather what conditions should be attached before 
government would commit increased funding? 
It is clear through the public record that the chief policy priority for government was to 
ensure that changes be made to the administrative structure of Football, to ensure that 
the future use of public funds would occur on a more responsible and accountable basis. 
The point was made clear in the Parliament by the Minister for Sport and Recreation 
Graham Edwards: 
Members would be aware that earlier this year I withheld approval ftJr 
further financial assistance to football until it was prepared to make some 
fundamental changes to its management structure so that it could resolve its 
problems. That resulted in the formation of the new Western Australian 
Football Commission. Since its formation the commission has put together 
a comprehensive strategy to resolve its financial difficulties and out the 
game on a viable of footing (WAPD, 19 September !989, p. 2186). 
Interestingly, the role of government implied in the above response contrasts with a 
previous response given by the Minister in the Parliament three months earlier in 
relation to the Government's role in the establishment of the Commission: 
lt was the WAFL's suggestion that a commission be formed, and talks are 
continuing in relation to that commission .... The people who will be making 
the decisions are the existing commissioners, the eight club presidents and 
IPL. I simply want to ensure that as much information as is available is 
placed before them. The decision is theirs. I will simply be asking them to 
make a decision as to whether they want Government assistance; if not I am 
happy to leave them to their own decision making processes. The only 
reason we got involved was because we were asked to get involved. We 
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believe in trying to assist what is a fundamental part of our society, and we 
are happy to do that, although I wish at times that we had not 0N APD, 12 
April1989, pp. 815-816). 
It is also interesting to note the sentiment conveyed by the Minster's closing remarks in 
the above statement. A review of Hansard reveals a peculiar paradox in relation to 
government involvement with Western Australian Football. On one hand there is the 
attitude that the Minister for Sport and Recreation should not have to answer questions 
relating to the W AFC as such matters are outside the Minster's responsibilities. On the 
other there is the seemingly irresistible urge to become involved in Football matters. 
The conflict of responsibility and interest are represented in the following remarks from 
the President of the Legislative Council: 
The reason I call the member to order is that I have for many years had 
difficulty in regard to the asking of questions in connection with the 
administration of football in Western Australia. Although in the past there 
may have been reasonable grounds for believing that ministerial 
involvement may have been effective .... We usually let such questions go 
because we are all interested in what is happening in the football area and 
sometimes the Minister has inside information that is of interest to us 
(WAPD, 12 Apri11989, p. 816). 
The position of Football in Western Australian culture and the historically close 
relationship between Football and Western Australian government united as political 
forces to ensure that the Government would set aside arguments that the market should 
be left to determine the fate of Western Australian Football. In addition to these factors, 
which were probably sufficient to sway any Western Australian Government regardless 
of which party held power, as nott>,d by Nadel, (2000, p. 165) the incumbent Burke 
Labor Government "had a 'pro-business' and interventionist policy." 
While the Government played a significant role in the establishment of the Commission, 
it is clear from the WAFL Inc.'s and IPL's own documents that they too accepted that a 
commission type structure was necessary. The Fang Report (2000, p. 10) confirms the 
negotiated nature of the eventual solution, "the State Government's support was 
conditional on the administration of football in W A being restructured in a manner 
mutually satisfactory to the football systems and the Government." Both parties 
recognised that there needed to be a stronger alignment between the interests of the 
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WCE and the W AFL and that under the current administrative structure ~uch an 
outcome could not be achieved. The W AFL Inc. (1988, p.2) recognised that inherent 
conflicts of interest could not be effectively dealt with in the absence of a "strong 
independent body to run football." Of particular interest to this study is the W AFL 
Inc.'s conclusion (1998, p. 9) that the administrative structure was also unsuitable on 
the grounds that there existed "a lack of accountability to the football public and 
government. Consequently there is a need to segregate the football policy 
administration from the administration of football 'the business'." In April 1989, the 
W AFL Inc. released a Position Statement in relation the proposed WAFC. It stated: 
The formation of an appropriately com .. ituted Commission is a priority for 
the development of football in this State and it must ensure strict discipline 
over all clubs whilst at the same time having the confidence of the entire 
football industry. Its major objective must be to develop all levels of 
football from juniors through to the Eagles [WCE] under a united umbrella 
and ensure maximum public support an involvement in the game. 
The combination of government imposed conditions and the pragmatic realisation by 
the Western Australian Football industry that fundamental change was required led to 
the establishment of Western Australian Football Commission when the W AFL Inc. 
Constitution was amended on June 16, 1989. The Government provided additional 
assistance to enable the Commission to be formed and to provide a basis for it to be able 
to become self-supporting. The assistance included: 
o $100,000 for establishment costs; 
• An additional $250,000 per year for the Football Development Trust; 
,. The vesting of Subiaco Oval in hands of the Commission (Subiaco Oval is a 
Crown Reserve vested in the City of Subiaco. The revestment did not actually 
proceed. However, in February 1991 the Commission entered into a 99 year 
lease agreement with the City of Subiaco); 
• A five year moratorium on the servicing of debt for the two tier grandstand at 
Subiaco Oval; and 
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o A government backed guarantee for $2.1 million4 to provide funds for the 
Commission to secure the future of Football (W APD, 19 September 1989, pp. 
2186,2187 & 31 October 1989, p. 4066). 
The appointment of initial Commissioners proved to be somewhat troublesome. 
Following a period that saw the appointment of an interim Commission, an inaugural 
Commission and a revised Commission, the final appointments were made - Dr Peter 
Tannock (Chairman), Mr Kevin Edwards and Mr John Fuhrmann (W AFC Annual 
Report, 1989, p.6). The multiple attempts to finalise the Commission's composition 
were related to the need to find candidates acceptable to both the Government and the 
Football industry (Ovens, 3 July 2002). The newly amended Constitution granted 
significant powers to the Commission5• It is important in the conte:o:t of the evaluation 
of the Commission to consider the rationale behind the Commission being granted such 
extensive authority over all aspects of Western Australian Football. Given theW AFL's 
extended slide into financial difficulty of the past decade, the Government was not 
about to commit extra funding without strong reassurance that theW AFL would 'get its 
house in order'. According to Edwards (11 July 2002) "the structure of the clubs 
running Football was akin to putting Christopher Skase in charge of passports." 
The price to be paid for government assistance by the W AFL was a transfer in the 
control of Football from the W AFL clubs to the Commission. Tannock (2 September 
2002) has described this transfer of control as something of "an imposed solution rather 
than a natural one", suggesting that the reduction in control by the W AFL was not 
entirely of their choosing. The Government ensured this transition by insisting upon 
constitutional arrangements that would grant extensive powers to the new Commission 
and by exerting influence over the initial appointment of Commissioners. The 
Government's efforts to reach agreement on the initial composition of lhe Commission 
are expressed in a letter from the Minister for Sport and Recreation to the Chainnan of 
the WAFL Inc. in March 1989. The Jetter stated, "I must reiterate that I have given 
careful consideration to the composition of this Commission, whose fonnation is 
dependant on Government monies being granted . . . . It is my view that you should 
4 This guarantee was pivotal to reducing the Commission's interest expense (Tannock, 2 September 
2002). 
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accept these nominations and that everyone should get behind these five peopl.e [the 
interim Commission announced on 8 November 1988 (WAPD, 16 November 1988, p. 
5292) comprised five members, the final Commission was to be comprised by the three 
members named above] and work to ensure a better future for foot baH in this State." 
The time had come for a change in who was running Football in Western Australia and 
given the relative bargaining position of the parties, the Government canied 
considerable weight in the negotiations. 
THE END OF THE BEGINNING 
The Commission's initial years were dominated by the need to return Western 
Australian Football to a sound financial basis6. Instrumental in this being achieved was 
the off and on field success of the WCE7. Although the earlier reliance on the WCE had 
proved to be initially problematic, by 1990 matters were beginning to turn in the 
Commission's favour. Under a nrw Victorian coach, Michael Malthouse, the WCE 
reached the finals in 1990 and eventually finished third at the end of the season. 
Attendances at WCE games in Perth increased by 30 per cent and theW AFC received 
royalty income of $789,000 (by 1994, the WCE contribution had risen to $2,251,000). 
According to theW AFC Chairman (W AFC Annual Report, 1990, p.3) "Football will 
continue to rely heavily upon the income generated by the West Coast Eagles in this 
state to enable the fabric of our fo0tball system to continue to prosper." 
Interest payments on the high levels of debt inherited by the Commission and costs 
associated with the settling lease arrangements with IPL and the City of Subiaco in 
relation to the use of Subiaco Oval prevented the Commission from recording an 
operating profit in 1990, but all the signs were there that the financial situation was 
beginning to tum around (WAFC Annual Report, 1990, p.3). In 1991, the Commission 
(once again mainly due to the perfonnance of the WCE) and 7 out of the 8 W AFL clubs 
recorded operating profits (WAFC Annual Report, 1991, p.4). It was also the year that 
~This did not directly affect the WAFI. club's constitutions or assets. 
6 Tannock (September 2 2002) dee:ribed the Commission as "in some ways the receiver/manager for 
Football in Western Australia. 
7 It should be noted that by 1989 the W AFC had via a debt for equity swap effectively secured control of 
IPL and hence was the majority owner of the WCE. However, it would take until 2000 for the WCE to 
become a wholly owned entity of the Commission {W AFC Annual Reports, 1989 & 2000). 
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witnessed the execution of the 99-year lease with the City of Subiaco that the 
Government had facilitated via legislation in December 1989. The prolonged 
negotiations to settle arrangements related to ground use and income from Subiaco Oval 
had finally come to an end and the WCE and theW AFC had finally secured a basis on 
which to plan for future development. 
While there was much to be satisfied with in relation to the Football's overall fmancial 
position, the status of theW AFL competition continued to be of concern. The W AFL 
clubs were now operating in an environment in which the intensification of interest in 
the WCE had been accompanied by a reduction in attendances and the standing of the 
W AFL competition. In 1986, the year prior to the introduction of the WCE, 630,000 
people had attended W AFL games, in 1987 that number dropped to approximately 
300,000. It was not unti11991 that combined football attendances in Western Australia 
(WAFL games and WCE home games) exceeded the 1986 total when it reached 
approximately 625,000 (Tannock, 1995). Interestingly, the total attendances in 1979 
were approximately 800,000, a period which corresponded with the peak period in the 
W AFL described earlier in this paper. The W AFL clubs were now in a position in 
which they had become heavily reliant on the Commission to distribute income in the 
fonn of Coaching and Management Grants. The size of distribution was influenced by 
the earnings of the Commission, which of course was principally determined by the 
performance of the WCE (and later the Fremantle Dockers). 
The relationship between the WCE and theW AFL had turned full circle. The WAFL 
had been responsible for the creation of the WCE and now the viability of the W AFL 
was significantly dependant on the ability of the WCE to direct income to the W AFC. 
The WAFL's dependence on the Commission as a source of income was also 
accompanied by a lack of ability under the W AFC Constitution to influence the 
membership or policy of the Commission. Prior to the amendment of the W AFC 
Constitution in 1994, theW AFL clubs, via the PJ.esident's Council (the Presidents of the 
WAFL clubs, elected by their members) could only suggest candidates for election to 
the Commission. It was the Commission which appointed Commission members and 
an appointment could only be vetoed by a% majority of clubs (WAFC Constitution, 
amended 1989, Section 3). The 1989 Constitution also granted the Commission the 
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right to annually review licences to participate in the W AFL competition and a licence 
could be removed if % of the Commissioners voted in favour of expulsion. Other 
fundamental issues such as the relocation of W AFL clubs required a % majority of the 
W AFL clubs to object to a Commission decision for it not to take effect (W AFC 
Constitution, amended 1989, Sections 7&9). Despite the extent of its powers the 
Commission did not use them to reshape the W AFL competition in its early years. 
However, the changes in the Western Australian Football marketplace made the 
prospect of further change inevitable. The question was how would it be achieved and 
what form would it take? 
By 1991 the Government's decision to fund a rescue of Football and to negotiate for a 
powerful and independent Commission to administer the game in Western Australia 
appeared to have been successful. Within the space of three years the primary goal of 
stabilising the financial status of Western Australian Football had been achieved 
without any significant resistance from the Football industry or the public8• The 
decision to assist Football partly reflected the political reality that the Government 
could not remain idle and allow Football to collapse and that Football had arrived at a 
position where it could not save itself. It also reflected the historically close partnership 
between government and Football in Western Australia, a partnership that had resulted 
in government being the principal lender of money to Football. The decision should 
also be seen in the context of the position of sport, and in particular Football, in 
Australian culture9• The Minister for Sport and Recreation at the time confinned his 
'strong feeling' that the Government should help Football because of its support for 
sport in general and the unique place of Football in Australian culture (Edwards, 11 July 
2002). 
Given these broad and specific social and political parameters, ·he decision should 
neither be viewed as complex or politically courageous. However, as 'natural' as it may 
have seemed for the Government to render assistance, the Government was not in such 
a hurry to help as to forget the legacy of decades of what it regarded as poor 
8 There was not a total absence of resistance, for example Nadel (2000, p. 208) refers to the activities of 
the 'Fight For Football Campaign' in the late 1980s. However, this was nothing like the scale of conflict 
that was to take place in the 2000-2001 period, which is detailed in Chapter Four. 
9 Discussed in detail in Chapter One. 
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administration. It did not want to have to confront the prospect of another assistance 
package in five years time. The Government's proposed solution achieved a shift in 
who was running Football in Western Australia and set in place a Commission with a 
Constitution that while achieving the Government's aim of giving the Commission 
sweeping powers to carry out the changes that those in the Government felt were 
overdue, did not make it particularly accountable to its immediate constituency, or for 
that matter to the public, via any fonnal Ministerial involvement. If the public interest 
was going to be monitored it would have to be achieved in a way removed from public 
scrutiny and indirectly through the ongoing funding relationship between government 
and the Commission. 
The issue of finding the appropriate balance between the independence of the 
Commission and its need to be responsive and accountable to its constituents would not 
surface in a substantia] sense for a number of years. Nevertheless, the roots of the issue 
are to be found in the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the Commission 
and the role of the Government in this matter should not be overlooked. However, 
none of these issues were prominent in 1992. Having secured the immediate future of 
Football in Western Australia the Commission was in a position to tum its attention to 
important strategic matters such as the redevelopment of Subiaco Oval, the securing of a 
licence to admit a second Western Australian based team to the AFL and the 
restructuring of the W AFL competition. These matters form the basis of the next 
chapter.· 
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CHAPTER THREE- THEW AY FORWARD 
After achieving the initial goal of returning the Western Australian Football industry to 
financial stability, the Commission was in a position to consider three critical strategic 
elements of its future. Firstly, the development of a permanent 'home' for AFL 
Football in Western Australia, that is, a venue to house the WCE's training and 
administrative facilities and to host AFL games. Secondly, the Commission was keen to 
pursue changes in the structure and market positioning of the W AFL competition. In 
particular, the Commission held the view that the traditional location of W AFL teams 
no longer was appropriate given the changes in the Football market place and the 
demographic shifts in the Perth metropolitan area. Thirdly, the Commission was 
promoting the desirability of establishing a second AFL team in Perth. Under the 
current single team situation there was no AFL game held in Perth every alternate week 
of the AFL season when the WCE travelled to the eastern states. The Commission was 
struggling to justify the investment of tens of millions of dollars in a facility that would 
be vacant every second week of the Football season. The introduction of the WCE has 
proved to be the vehicle for the self-sustainability of the Football industry, a second 
team, although clearly unlikely to be as successful, as rapidly, as the WCE, nevertheless 
offered the potential to grow the 'Football revenue pie' even further. 
This chapter is the story of these three strategic decisions taken by the Commission. 
This is not to suggest that the Commission was inactive in other areas of its 
govemance1, but these three areas, considerably more than any others, were to shape the 
direction of the Commission for the next ten years and ultimately provide the basis for 
much of the criticism that was to subsequently be directed at the Commission. The 
Commission was also in a position to consider its strategic options due in part to the 
coniinued support and financial backing of the Government. As at the end of the 
Commission's 1991 financial year its $4.9 million in loans were secured by government 
1 This study does not offer a detailed separate analysis of the Commission's football development 
activities, which are in the main canied out via the Football Development Trust. Although this area 
arguably represents a major component of the Commission's governance the scope of this thesis does not 
allow for all elements of the Commission's activities to be examined in depth. The issue is reviewed as 
part of the section on the restructuring of the WAFL and is also dealt with in Chapter Five. The recently 
completed McAullay Report provides a detailed review of the Western Australian Football devel·Jpment 
pathway. 
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guarantee and theW AFC had received over $3 million in government funding since its 
inception (W APD, 21 October 1992, pp. 5776-5777). 
THE REDEVELOPMENT OF SUBIACO OVAL 
Subiaco Oval had long been regarded as 'League Headquarters', in arldition to being the 
home of W AFL team the Subiaco Football Club, it had also been the long~term venue 
for W AFL finals matches and interstate games. However, Football itself did not own or 
control Subiaco Oval. The implications of this were recognized by the Minster for 
Sport and Recreation: 
I hope members will support me as I feel strongly about this matter. So far 
as I am concerned, football is something uniquely Australian and is part of 
our culture and heritage. It is unfortunate that after 104 years of the game it 
docs not have its own asset, either at league level in tenns of a headquarters, 
or at club level. I guess that says something about the management of 
football over all those years, particularly when one compares that with 
cricket, which is much better placed (WAPD, 28 Se,?tember 1989, p. 3033). 
As indicated in Chapter Two, the City of Subiaco did not support the revestment2 of 
Subi2:::o Oval to the Commission and there was a protracted period of negotiation 
between the State Government, the City and theW AFC. The situation was to eventually 
find a remedy in lhe reaching of a 99-year lease agreement between the two parties. The 
Commission agreed to pay a 'peppercorn' rental for the use of the Oval and for all 
intents and purposes it had importantly, for the first time, secured control over its 
principal asset. Redevelopment could finally proceed with the confidence that the 
Commission was now in a position to exert control over its principal assets. 
Subiaco Oval's long~term status as the 'Home of Football' in Western Australia meant 
that it was still the most obvious candidate in the Commission's search for developing 
an AFL standard venue in Western Australia. According to the Commission (WAFC 
Annual Report, 1993, p.2), alternative sites were considered, "but after studying all 
options, it was found none came close to matching Subiaco Oval, given the long and 
favourable lease the Commission has on the ground, its existing infrastructure and the 
2 There were concerns that vesting of Subiaco Oval to the W AFC would represent an erosion of local 
government rights and control over crown reserves (Fuhrmann, 2 August 2002). 
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costs associated with developing any alternative venue." It had become obvious to the 
Commission that the venue no longer met the standards expected in the AFL 
competition. According to the Chainnan of the Commission: 
A highlight of the year's football [the year 1991] was to see the first AFL 
final ever played outside Victoria conducted at Subiaco Oval and this event 
reinforced the need for improved facilities at this venue if the success and 
following of the game is to continue at current rates (W AFC Annual Report, 
1991, p. 3). 
While the desirability of new facilities was clearly apparent, the WAFC faced a problem 
that its predecessor body, WAFL Inc., also had to face in earlier years- how to fund the 
capital cost of a major redevelopment without significantly impacting on the Football 
industry and in particular the now highly grant dependent WAFL? Unlike other states, 
such as South Australia3, Football in Western Australia had not taken steps in earlier 
decades to secure the ownership and develop infrastructure at a time when the game was 
arguably in a much more advantageous position to do so. In refening to the deficiencies 
in past planning the WAFL's 1998 Review of Future Structural Needs of Western 
Australian Football (p. 8) commented that "the most notable of these is seen to be the 
failure to acquire a headquarters ground for major level football in this State, similar to 
Football Park in South Australia." The Mitchell Report (1983, p. 21) had, as early as 
1983, cautioned against proceeding with further redevelopment without having first 
secured government support and funding commitment. In the Report's view Subiaco 
Oval had already been invested in to a point beyond the capacity of Western Australian 
Football. According to the Report: 
It is beyond doubt that the provision of much needed public facilities at 
Subiaco Oval has created an enormous drain upon the already stretched 
finances of the League and consequently upon the dividends of all clubs. 
The cost of the clubs in tenns of diminished dividends in 1984 will be $576, 
705. This amount is directly attributable to the improvements at Subiaco 
Oval and does not include the annual rent (1983, p. 21). 
3 In South Australia, the major venue is Football Park (recently renamed AAMI Stadium after a corporate 
sponsorship deal), which was owned by Football in South Australia when the South Australians entered 
the AFL competition. This meant that at a time of rapid change and escalating cost pressures, the South 
Australian Football system has not had to support large debt repayments to fund infrastructure as has been 
the case in Western Australia- a crucial point of difference. 
40 
However, in 1991 the W AFC was beginning to reap the benefits of the cash flow 
generated by the successful WCE and there was a degree of confidence that this would 
continue to grow in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the fact remained that entering 
into another large debt carried risk and that government support was still very much 
needed in order to proceed with an acceptable degree of confidence. As mentioned in 
Chapter One, the relationship between Football and government has been influenced by 
the relative ability of Football to generate revenues from the market and the non-
international nature of the sport. These factors have featured in the debate over 
government funding for the redevelopment of Subiaco Oval. 
Mitchell (1983, p. 21) argued that Subiaco Oval should be regarded as a public 
entertainment venue in the same way as the Entertainment Centre or His Majesty's 
Theatre and should be funded by government accordingly. The Report also recognised 
that it would be easier to attract funding for Subiaco Oval if it were to be the venue for 
sports other than Football (Subiaco Oval has hosted major Rugby Union and Soccer 
events). Venue use in Perth contrasts with Victoria for example where the Melbourne 
Cricket Ground (the 'MCG') is the home of Football, cricket, hosted the Olympic 
Games in 1956 and is to be the main venue for the Commonwealth Games in 2006 
($400 million is being spent on the MCG's redevelopment, most of which is coming 
from public funds). The Victorian Government would not contemplate such an 
investment in the MCG for Football alone, the Commonwealth Games gives enhanced 
legitimacy to the expenditure (Gough, 2002). Cricket and Football also share venues in 
Brisbane and Sydney. 
In Perth, the Western Australian Cricket Association ground (the 'WACA') is the home 
of cric~et and Subiaco Oval the home of Football. While there were attempts by 
Football and cricket administrators tu reach agreement on developing either the WACA 
(Football has been played on and off at theW ACA for a number of years, more recently 
AFL night games were hosted by the venue, prior to the installation of lighting at 
Subiaco Oval and the eventual transfer of all Football to that venue) or Subiaco Oval, a 
mutually satisfactory arrangement could not be reached (Ovens, 3 July 2002, Fuhrmann, 
2 August 2002). There have also been attempts by the Western Australian Government 
to facilitate a higher degree of facility sharing between cricket and Football. The Burke 
Government in the mid-1980s forced Football and cricket to come together by funding 
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the installation of lighting at the WACA (Aisbett, 2002, p.S). The Court Coalition 
Government had hoped to persuade both the W ACA and the Commission to relinquish 
their respective facilities and use the proceeds to fund a new stadium that the 
Government would construct at the Belmont Park racecourse. This stadium was to be 
the major stadium for the 2006 Commonwealth Games and later it was to be the shared 
venue for Football and cricket. In the end the Government did not proceed with its bid 
for the Commonwealth Games as the tenns and conditions of the Commonwealth 
Games Association were not acceptable to Treasury and so the stimulus that the Games 
may have provided for a rationalisation of Western Australia's major sports venues was 
lost (Moore, 9 September 2002). More recently the Gallop Government tried to 
convince cricket administrators to conduct their major matches at Subiaco Oval, a move 
that cricket declined to make (Aisbett, 2002, p.S). Despite the efforts of successive 
State Governments, cricket and Football remain at separate venues. As a result, the 
Western Australian sports market and taxpayers have supported development at two 
major sports complexes, one largely unutilised in summer, the other in winter. 
Both cricket and Football have at various times entered into considerable debt to fund 
facilities (the WACA for its redevelopment in the mid~l980s and Football on several 
occasions, including the most recent redevelopment of Subiaco Oval). In ideal 
circumstances both cricket and Football administrators from their perspective, 
understandably prefer to be in complete control of their respective facilities4• However, 
the question must be asked whether, given the specific circumstances in Westem 
Australia, there was greater scope for government involvement to attempt to facilitate 
an a3reement between cricket and Football (and other sports) that would have seen 
public funds concentrated in the development of a single multi-use facility? Perth has 
suffered from the lack of a coordinated long tenn sporting facility plan, a situation 
which extends back in time to the nature of the facilities that were constmcted for the 
Empire Games (now Commonwealth Games) held in Perth in 1962. 
The long~tenn impact of sports facility planning cannot be underestimated and Western 
Australia currently finds itself in a poor situation in comparison to similar Australian 
4 In the 1970s the YR.. constructed a stadium at Waverly in Melbourne (now sold and repla.::ed by the 
Docklands Stadium) in part to escape the influence of the Melbourne Cricket Club at the MCG and South 
Australia has Adelaide Oval for cricket and Football Park for Football. 
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states. An attempt to address this situation has been made with tbe recently released 
State Sporting Facility Plan (Baddock, 25 July 2002). The story of the development of 
Western Australia's major sporting facilities is long and complex and well beyond the 
scope of this thesis. However, even the most superficial review of previous decades 
readily reveals that the interests of individual sporting organisations have driven major 
facility planning. It is one thing for sporting organisations to advance their own 
interests5 (even if the associated debt brings the sport to the brink of collapse); it is 
another thing entirely when public funds are being used to facilitate such phms. The 
role of government should be to act in the overall long-term public interest. 
Historically, sporting facility planning in Western Australia appears to have been driven 
by other political priorities and the ability of individual sporting codes to pursue their 
own direction. 
The first phase of the redevelopment of Subiaco Oval was the construction of the 
'Southern Stand' (to be known as the Town & Country Stand by the time of its opening 
by the Prime Minister in May 1995 after the Town & Country Bank invested $1 million 
dollars in the resurlacing of the Oval and improvements to spectators facilities on the 
eastern side). The cost of the Stand was offset by an $8 milliun grant from the Federal 
Government, to which the W AFC added in the vicinity of an additional $4m to achieve 
greater spectator capacity (WAFC Annual Report, 1993, p.6). In 1996, Planning 
Commission approval was granted to allow for the construction of lighting at Subiaco 
Oval, which allowed for the playing of night games at the venue. The AFL, the FFC 
and the WCE each contributed $1 million to the project, with the remainder being 
funded by the Commission (W AFC Annual Report, 1996, p. 5). 
The final component of the redevelopment of~ ~biaco Oval was undertaken throughout 
1999/2000 and involved the provision of additional spectator seating, taking the ground 
capacity to 43,500, the installation of two electronic scoreboards and new administrative 
dnd training facilities for the WCE. According to the Parliamentary record, the final 
cost was $42 million (WAPD, 13 June 2001, p. 7606). This was funded from a number 
of sources. The State Government agreed to contribute $30 million over twenty years 
s For example, the most recent $12 million redevelopment of the WACA is being funded without any 
government contribution (Aisbett, 2002, pp. 4-5). 
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($1.5 million per annum) towards the principal borrowed by the Commission6• The 
AFL agreed to support the interest expense on $5 million of borrowings ($325,000 per 
annum, which roughly equated to the capital cost of the WCE's facilities) and the 
WCEs also contributed to the cost of their new facilities (W AFC Annual Report, 1998). 
The final funding arrangements did not reflect the preferred position of the 
Commission, which relied on a much greater contribution from public sources. Its 
funding model called for an equal cost sharing between the State and Federal 
Governments and private debt raised by the Commission (Tannock, 1992, p.12). Based 
on this funding arrangement, the Commission was optimistic that the redevelopment 
would not adversely impact on other aspects of Western Australian Football (Tannock, 
1992, p.12). However, given th~ final funding arrangements, the Commission was less 
confident that the larger than expected increase in debt would not have a detrimental 
effect. According to the Chairman: 
The Commission enters into the ~1ext des)ade with a substantial debt, mainly 
related to the development of Subi? . ..:o Oval. While this debt has been 
entered into on a fully commercial basis, and with the support from the State 
Government in relation to principal payments, it will nevertheless be a 
burden that for the next few years will restrict the availability of cash from 
the Commission to meet emerging needs (W AFC Annual Report, 1998). 
The decision to redevelop Subiaco Oval in the manner in which it was undertaken has 
been subject to a degree of criticism. However, much of this criticism has arisen from 
the flow on effects to other areas of Football, such as reductions in grants to W AFL 
clubs and admission prices to Subiaco Oval, rather than the redevelopment itself. These 
criticisms will be dealt with in depth in the following chapters, including an 
examination of the role of government in the redevelopment. However, it is necessary 
at this point to consider what, if any, othe:- OIJlions were available to the Commission. 
As far as Football is concerned (and many other sports) the shift in the nature in the 
consumption of sport has had a dramatic impact on sporting administration. The 
'traditiona~' football spectator has changed throughout the 1990s, described in the 
6 According the McGlue (2002, p.6) the W AFC has a total debt of about $25 million in relation to the 
redevelopment of Subiaco Oval. The Commission's 2001 interest bill was $2.74 million, which 
according to McGlue suggests a high interest rate. Aisbett (2002, pp. 4-5) states the W AFC's debt is 
$34.5 million with an annual interest bill of $2.5 million. According to the Commission its debt stands at 
$33 million (Lague, 2002, p. 64). 
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Crawford Report as a 'purchaser of a theatre ticket' 7 (2001, p. 10). Football has become 
another entertainment product, existing in an increasingly diverse and competitive 
market place. While there are doubtless those who regret the passing of the days when 
it was more affordable to attend a match and stand in the outer to cheer on their team 
(perhaps with good reason), unfortunately those days are fast coming to an end. The 
cost and market pressures on Football demand high quality facilities that will attract and 
retain 'premium' consumers, especially those from the corporate sector, so necessary to 
grow and maintain the revenues of the W AFC's cash cows- the WCE and the FFC8. A 
point recognised by the Commission: 
In previous annual reports we have reported the significant plans for the 
development of Subiaco Oval as a necessary requirement for the long-term 
development of the game. Not to develop Subiaco Oval would have left the 
Commission with a deteriorating return on royalties and as a consequence 
limited our ability to invest in the games and its development at other levels 
(WAFC Annual Report, 1998). 
In reality, the Football market place left the W AFC with very little choice but to 
redevelop Subiaco Oval. There should be no misconception surrounding the fact the 
decision in part reflected the ever increasing pressure of commercialisation on Football 
and it would be unreasonable to hold the W AFC accountable for its response to 
pressures well beyond its control. The Commission also needed to provide its AFL 
teams with the same opportunities for revenue generation and high standard 
training/playing facilities, which would enable them to compete with the facilities 
enjoyed by Victorian and South Australian based teams. The Commission's resolve to 
proceed was strengthened by $38 million in Federal and State Government fundiug, 
which is a significant contribution in terms of public funding for Western Australian 
sporting bodies (Fuhrmann, 2 August 2002). While there may be matters of contention 
in relation to timing, design and financing9, the Commission made the decision to 
1 The term 'theatregoer' is also used by Nadel (2000, pp. 276·277) to describe the 0rientation of the 
AFL's attendance strategies. Nadel questions whether theatregoing attendees are a significant factor in 
football attendances, arguing that aligned club supporters still make up the vast majority of Football 
spectators. 
8 In 2001 only 3,000 seats out of Subiaco Oval's 42,000 seats were available at the general adult 
admission price of $15.75 (Tickner, 2001, p. 3). All other seats are subject to a varying degree of 
'premium' loading. 
9 The redevelopment of Subiaco Oval has attracted criticism on the basis that it proceeded at a rate 
beyond Football's capacity to support it (Metropolis, 12 August 2002). This must be balanced with the 
considerable cost savings of proceeding with the total extent of the development at the same time. 
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redevelop Subiaco Oval in the long term interests of Football, even if it meant that there 
would be some short term financial pain for the Western Australian Football industry. 
After all, the role of providing overall leadership was one of the major driving factors 
behind the Commission's establishment. 
RESTRUCTURING THEW AFL 
Chapter Two described the lasting impact on the WAFL of the expanded AI•L 
competition. The WAFC has sought from the very beginning to restructure theW AFL 
to more appropriately reflect the changes in the Western Australian Football 
marketplace. While the W AFC has sought to exercise control over W AFL clubs 
finances in such areas as debt reduction and cost controls (Tannock, 1992, pp. 2-3); by 
far the most controversial and resisted W AFC initiated changes have related to attempts 
to restructure the competition. In essence this has revolved around the number of teams 
in the competition and the location of those teams. These matters strike at the very 
heart of dub identity and tradition and it is not surprising that much of the angst 
between the WAFL and the WAFC that was to intensify later in the Commission's 
existence, was to be generated from this issue. It should be remembered that the 
Commission was in a powerful position, both constitutionally and financially, to exert 
control over the W AFL. This position of relative strength has influenced the nature of 
the relationship between the W AFL and the W AFC leading to claims of autocracy and 
lack of consultation. The call for greater democracy and accountability in the 
governance of Western Australian Football is dealt with in Chapter Four; the focus at 
this stage is to understand the changes that were made to theW AFL, why they occurred, 
and how they were achieved. 
The first major policy statement by the Commission in respect to the restructure of the 
WAfL was the WA Football2000: A Plan for the Development of Australian Football 
in WA released in 1992. The documents key recommendations were a_s follows: 
• The development of the W AFL into the premium state league in Australia, 
consisting of 10 teams, eight of which would be located in the metropolitan area and 
two in the country; 
• That all W AFL clubs should be debt free, independent and self~supporting; 
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o There E.:tould be two AFL teams based in Perth that play their home games at a 
redeveloped Subiaco Oval; 
• That the Football Development Trust should be the major body underpinning the 
development of the game; and 
• The leadership and management structure of the sport be developed in a way which 
achieves an appropriate balance between all parties and interests and which helps to 
ensure the financial viability of the sport. 
The prime reasoning underlying the Commission's plans for theW AFL was that teams 
needed to be located in areas of population growth to capture the interest (and hopefully 
participation) of junior players. The days when young Australian males predominantly 
played cricket in the summer and Football in the winter have of course long since 
disappeared. The fight to capture the participation of Australia's youth is an ongoing 
concern for sports policy makers, an endeavor that now competes with a vast array of 
other sporting and non-sporting options. The absence of WAFL teams in Perth's 
growth corridors - the South West (Mandurah!Rockingham), the North West 
(Waneroo/Joondalup) and the South East (Armadale/Gosnells) was in the view of the 
Commission an impediment to capturing junior participation in Football. The 
Commission's preference was to relocate some of the existing W AFL clubs to these 
areas of growth (Tannock, 1992, p.4). Despite the Commission's preference for 
relocations to occur, the only example was the move of West Perth Football Club to 
Joondalup in 1994. 
By 1995, it was becoming dear that the Commission was dissatisfied with the pace of 
reform in the W AFL and the reluctance of the established clubs to accept change. 
Tannock's 1995 Report, Restructuring the WAFL in 1996/97, makes it clear that the 
time for action had arrived and that there should be a new look for the competition in 
1997 (1995, pp. 1-2). That new look was to be achieved via the admission of additional 
teams to the W AFL (the W AFC had originally hoped for two, in the end it was to be 
one). While the Commission (Tannock, 1995, p. 2) still held the view that mergers and 
relocations were the preferable course of action, it was no longer prepared to tolerate 
delays to the "vital injection of new blood and new communities into the W AFL 
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Peel Thunder's introduction was to lead to an ongoing campaign to remove them from 
the competition, principally led by elements within the W AFL and more recently to 
some extent by the Commission itself. Much has been made of the club's struggle to 
achieve on-field success. The question of whether Peel Thunder was ever given an 
adequate opportunity to field a competitive side is debatable. Former and current 
Commissioners have remarked that the major regret in relation to the introduction of 
Peel Thunder was that the Commission did not do enough to support the club11 (Ovens, 
3 July 2002; Parker, 16 August 2002). Detractors have also pointed to the impact of 
having a nine team competition on fixturing, which creates the need for a bye and the 
resultant disruption to the home and away season. It should be noted that it is not 
mandatory for Peel Thunder to be removed from the W AFL in order to achieve an eight 
team competition. However, the focus has predominantly been that Peel Thunder should 
be the team to be removed, despite the fact that according to the McCusker Report12 it is 
not entirely obvious that Peel should be the team to go. In this sense, the eight team 
competition argument has frequently been used to exclude Peel Thunder when the focus 
could legitimately be applied to other W AFL clubs. There is a strong element of last 
on, first off. Other arguments against Peel Thunder have included: 
• The substandard nature of their home grou11d facilities; 
• The fact that their supporters do not travel to games away from Mandurah (the 
home town of Peel Thunder, located one hours drive from Perth); 
• That Peel Thunder has diluted scant W AFL resources; and 
.. The introduction of Peel Thunder has had a detrimental effect on the Peel Football 
League. 
The most interesting aspect of the Peel Thunder issue to this study has been the role of 
the Commission. Up until 2000 the WAFC had been strong in its public stance that the 
introduction of Peel Thund{,f had been justified and although it had not ~:::en as 
successful as it would have liked it would be a retrograde step to remove them from the 
11 Part of the compromise to obtain enough votes from the traditional WAn clubs for the admission of 
Peel Thunder was that minimal funds should be directed towards its establishment, therefore minimising 
the impact on the funding of existing clubs. 
12 The Report by Malcolm McCusker QC was an audit of all nine WAFL clubs and assessed each club's 
on-field competitiveness, current financial position, future financial viability, potential for growth, 
football development and facilitates (Lewis, 2002, p.ll). 
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W AFL. This was to change with the publication of the Review of the Westar Rules 
Competition Report in December 2000, more commonly referred to as the Fang Report 
(the Chairman of the Review Committee was Dr Neale Fang). The Fang Report was 
the first major review of the WAFL since 1995. The Report rejects much oi the 
Commission's earlier reasoning (Fong, 2000, pp. 19-21). In particular it challenges the 
basic premise that W AFL teams need to be located in areas of high population growth. 
Peel Thunder's strategic importance to Westar has not eventuated, as there 
has been no significant new supporter base to the competition. The 
argument has been put that with such a large growth area then Peel needed 
to be serviced for football. This point is moot in that there is a counter 
~'r~ument that it does not require :- Westar club to be located in that region 
r football in a region to be developccl ng, 2000, p. 21). 
TIL o~g Report concludes that the withdrawal of Peel Thunder is the best option for 
resuucturing the WAFL. The Report has subsequently received a great deal of support 
from theW AFL clubs and more recently, from the Conunission itself. In 2002, now 
under the Chainnanship of Dr Neale Fang, the W AFC admitted that the introduction of 
Peel Thunder had been a mistake. According to Fang, (cited in Lewis, 2002, p. 94) 
.. The issuing of the original licence to Peel FC in 1996 is considered to be, in hindsight, 
an incorrect decision. Whilst at the time the locati0a of teams in population centres was 
considered appropriate, that view is no longer held." Many do not share the current 
Commission's view, including former Commission members. The attempt to retain 
Peel Thunder in W AFl.. competition has had the support of the AFL, the State 
Government, at least one other 'V AFL club13 and the former leader of the Federal 
Opposition (Peel Thunder is located in his electorate). Despite views to the contrary, it 
is obvious that the Commission now prefers the arguments put forward by the majority 
of the WAFL clubs. (Lague & Lewis, 2001, p. 56; WAPD, 2 August 2001, pp.l957-
1960; WAPD, 9 May 2002, p. 10198; Lague, 2002, p. G4). 
The question that. must be asked from a policy standpoint is what had changed between 
1995 and 2000 for there to be a reversal of thinking of such magnitude? There are two 
strands to a potential answer to this question. Firstly, the reversal could be a result of 
the WAFC's ability to review the introduction of Peel Thunder after it had been in 
13 In May 2002 the West Perth Football Club voted for the retention of Peel Thunder in the W AFL 
competition. 
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existence for over five years. Such an evaluation could legitimately demonstrate that 
the experiment had not worked. The Fong Report essentially puts forward such an 
argument. The other alternative is that the change in thinking could have arisen as a 
result of changes in the composition/style of the Commission. In other words, it is not 
so much that the facts underpinning the competing arguments have changed, but rather, 
that the Commission's position in relation to the arguments had shifted. The precise 
impact of both factors cannot be measured with any degree of accuracy. However, it is 
clear that the Commission's approach to dealing with the Peel Thunder issue is 
indicative of the style of leadership adopted by the Commission following the election 
of a new Chairman in December2001. According to Fong: 
We had to build a culture of working together in the industry. The culture 
had become such that there had been a fair bit of animosity and mistrust of 
the various parts of the football industry .... We want to go about being much 
more participative and consultative in our management of the industry (cited 
in Lewis, 2002, p. 10). 
The question of whether Peel Thunder would remain in the W AFL competition in 2003 
came to a head when the traditional eight WAFL clubs voted to remove Peel Thunder 
frol1, the competition (the vote was seven 1.0 one) in May 2002. Peel Thunder 
immediately moved to take legal action, :uguing that their licence had not been 
legitimately cancelled and sought a court ruling that they were entitled !o be treated in 
the same way as any other licence holder in the W AFL competition (Lagu~. 2002, p. 
114). The prospect of a costly, drawn out legal dispute did not appeal to the WAFC, 
which could ill afford an estimated $500,000 in legal fees that would have to be funded 
by the Football industry. The final outcome was not so much a solution as a 
postponement. In return for increased coaching and management grants from the 
W AFC, the traditional W AFL clubs agreed to Peel Thunder being granted a licence to 
compete in the 2003 W AFL season (Lague, 2.002, p. 66). While costly legal action had 
been averted, the issue remains that in the absence of any mergers taking place before 
the 2004 W AFL season, the WAFC will find itself in precisely the same position. 
The prospect of a merger taking place was illustrated by the reaction of certain WAFL 
clubs during the period when Peel Thunder's future was being determined. There have 
been rumors of mergers involving Peel Thunder and East Fremantle Football Club, Peel 
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Thunder and South Fremantle Football Club and even traditional rivals South Fremantle 
and East Fremantle. None of the talk has translated into concrete action and some club 
presidents, such as the East Fremantle President, have felt the angry reaction of club 
members at the mere prospect of merger talks (Lague, 2002, p. 114). It will take a brave 
or desperate president to ask their members to vote on a merger proposal. Not 
surprisingly, in June 2002, the President of theW AFL Council of Presidents confinned 
that there were no current merger proposals between any WAFL clubs (Lague, 2002, p. 
66). Given the long standing nature of the W AFL clubs resistance to ~hange and 
despite the W AFC offering an attractive incentive package for clubs to merge, it is 
likely that the Commission is still going to have to confront the Peel Thunder issue in 
the future. The issue has been and continues to be a strong test of the Commission's 
leadership and its capacity to act independently of individual stakeholder interests when 
circumstances demand that it do so. For the time being the Commission will be hoping 
for a merger, which everyone in Football thinks is a good idea as long as it does not 
involve their Football club. Despite the current stance of the Commission, the question 
remains, was the introduction of Peel Thunder a good concept that has suffered from a 
lack of support and poor implementation, or just a plain bad idea? 
A SECOND AFL TEAM 
As mentioned above, the 1992 Report WA Football 2000: A Plan for the Development 
of Australian Football in WA called for the establishment of a second AFL team in 
Perth. This followed on from a recommendation of the Hatt Committee14 in 1991 that a 
second team be entered into the AFL by 1994. In 1993 the AFL granted theW AFC a 
licence to enter a Fremantle based team into the AFL competition commencing in 1995. 
The decision for the new team to have Fremantle as a base was not a difficult one. 
According to Nadel (2000, p. 223) plans for a second Western Australian team in the 
national competition based in Fremantle had existed since 1984. The Fremantle area 
has a strong association with Football and it was this sense of tradition and identity that 
the team to eventually be known as the Fremantle Dockers was designed to capture. 
According to Nadel (2000, p. 24) "Fremantle attempted to anchor itself in the myths of 
14 The Committee had been fonned in October 1990 and was chaired by David Hatt then from the 
Australian Sports Commission and later CEO of the FFC and also included Mal Brown, Dwane 
Buckland, Tom Stannage and Merv Cowan (Nadel, 2000, p. 223). 
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its region as the port of the city. (In fact it wears an anchor on its jumper) It "chose the 
name" (i.e. the Dockers) "quite deliberately after a long period of research." This 
element of duferentiation was essential if the FFC was to create a separate market :1iche 
to that of the well established WCE. 
The factors underlying the establishment of the FFC were not totally dissimilar from the 
thinking that underpinned the introduction of the WCE. The FFC would help to grow 
the revenue available to the Commission, although some cannibalisation of the WCE's 
market share was anticipated, it was thought this would be marginal and over time 
would not be a factor. As stated in the W AFC Annual Report (1993, p. 2) "it is the 
opinion of the Commission that a second WA-based team in the AFL was inevitable 
and that such a team would ultimately be advantageous to football in this state." The 
FFC would assist the Commission by allowing the redeveloped Subiaco Oval to be 
utilised every week of the Football season, therefore allowing for greater resource 
utilisation. The FFC would also offer an additional opportunity for young Western 
Australian Footballers to be able to stay in their home state and play Football at the 
highest level15• The idea of a second AFL team in Perth appealed to the AFL 
Commission who in addition to being supportive of the W AFC's plans also wanted the 
game to continue its national expansion. 
There are a number of factors that were to differentiate the introduction of the FFC from 
that of the WCE eight years previous. Significant among these were that the revenue 
expectations in relation to the FFC were not only more modest, but also less critical 
than the revenue needed from the WCE in the late 1980s16. The FFC did not have the 
same financial expecLLions and it was not under the same initial pressures to succeed17• 
This is entirely appropriate, not only in light of the FFC being the second team in a 
market dominated by the successful WCE, but also due to a recognition of the 
difficulties faced by new teams, principally related to their ability to assemble a 
competitive player group. After some difficult initial years in which the WCE suffered 
from a lack of facilities and unfavourable AFL imposed rules designed to reduce the 
!:>Maybe true in 1995 but after the ending of initial draft concessions and the operation of an unrestricted 
national draft the eventual destination of Western Australian Footballers is something of a lottery. 
1 ~ Western Australian Football was not verging on insolvency when the FFC was admitted into the AFL. 
17 Unlike the VFL's 1986 demand that the $4 million WCE's licence fee be paid up front, the AFL 
allowed the WAFC to repay the FPC's licence fee over ten years (Nadel, 2000, p. 224). 
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threat of a virtual State team, the AFL was persuaded to grant more favourable 
conditions to the WCE in the interests of the nationalisation of the game (Linnell, 1995, 
p. 257). As a result of draft concessions and an increased player list the WCE were able 
to secure access to the cream of W AFL talent. While not being in the true sense a State 
team, the final result was something very close to it The Fremantle Dockers were not 
given the same degree of access, nor did the WAFL in 1994/95 after years of operation 
of the national draft contain the richer pickings that had been available to the WCE. 
According to Nadel (2000, p. 225) 
Fremantle officials have since expressed some concern about the k.vel uf 
draft concessions, but while it may not compare favourably to the a'.sistance 
given the Eagles between 1989 to 1991, some years after their foundation, 
the concessions were still the best recruiting conditions given to an 
expansion club for its first season and were markedly better than those Port 
Adelaide was to receive in 1996. 
There has been an ongoing debate about whether the FFC maximised the recruitment 
concessions it was offered. However, for the purposes of this study it is sufficient to 
conclude that for a variety of reasons the FFC was not able to assemble a player squad 
of comparable strength to that of the initial years of the WCE. Given that on-field 
success is vitally important to areas such as membership, sponsorship and attendances, 
the inability for the FFC to field a team with a realistic prospect of playing finals 
Football has proved to be an ongoing concern, placing an even greater emphasis on the 
management and governance of the club. 
While the initial limitations imposed en t~~ FFC's ability to field a competitive team are 
relevant, the purpose of this study is once again to focus on the role of the Commission 
in the plight of the FFC. Unlike the introduction of Peel Thunder there has been no 
serious campaign mounted against the concept of the FFC. However, like Peel Thunder 
there have been many questions raised about the implementation aspects of the FFC. It 
must be emphasised that the FFC is in essence a 'division' of the WAFC, that is, from 
the outset it has been one hundred percent owned and ultimately controlled by the 
W AFC. This structure was actively sought by the Commission. The Annual Report 
(1993, pp. 2-3) states "the Commission also holds the view that it is necessary for 
financial stability and the development of football in WA that a second team should 
come under the control of the Commission. It is pleasing that the AFL concurs with this 
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view." Th~ Commission exerts control over the WCE and FFC through the 
appointment of board members to IPL and FFC Limited18• The IPL and FFC Limited 
boards in turn exercise overaJI governance over the WCE and the FFC, which have their 
own boards. The question of how board members of these entitiP.s should be appointed 
and what should be the appropriate relationship between the two Western Australian 
AFL clubs and the Commission are major features of the Crawford Report, which is 
discussed in detail in Chapter Four. For the purposes of this current analysis it is 
sufficient to state that the Commission canies a degree of responsibility for the overall 
performance of the FFC and that its performance up unti12001 has been poor. While it 
is legitimate to argue that the Commission ought to be held principally accountable in a 
general governance sense, rather than a day to day operational sense, it remains the case 
that the Commission appoints those who were responsible for running the FFC. 
Maladministration of either AFL club has the potential to a have a significant adverse 
impact on the entire Western Australian Football. This is not to argue that the 
Commission should be heavily involved in operational matters, in ideal circumstances 
the Commission should maximise the independence of the board it has appointed to do 
its job free from external interference19 • However, when there are major problems over 
an extended period the Commission ought to be compelled to act. 
The year 2001 was in many respects a year of crisis for the FFC. In that year: 
• The coach was replaced mid-season; 
e The FFC finished the AFL season in last place; 
o The FFC made a loss of $2.5 million20 (in 2000, the FFC made a loss of $1.37 
million)~ and 
18 The power the W AFC exerts over the FFC and the WCE is exercised through the two legal entities of 
Indian Pacific Limited (in the case of the WCE) and Fremantle Football Club Limited. The purpose of 
the two boards is to provide some distance between the W AFC and the direct running of the two AFL 
clubs. According to Fuhrmann (2 August 2002) such arrangements reflected the concerns of the AFL 
who were worried that if both AFL clubs were under more direct control from the Commission that they 
would essentially represent a united voting block as AFL level. Despite the complexity and perhaps 
cumbersome nature of the arrangements, in :he end the W AFC owns and holds the licence for the WCE 
and FFC and is therefore is ultimately in a position to control appointments. 
19 Some commentators such as McGlue (2001, p.6) have argued that theW AFC should have no control 
over the WCE or the FFC and that the current arrangements represent an unhealthy conflict of interest. 
20 Since 1995 the FFC has contributed more than $12 million to Western Australian Football through 
payment of royalties, ground rental fees, transfer fees for W AFL players and its contribution to the 
installation of lighting at Subiaco Oval (McGrath, 2002, p. 56). 
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• It was fined a total of $130,000 and given draft penalties in the 2002 draft for 
breaches of the salary cap. 
According to Lague (2001, p. 60), "the poor performance of Fremantle on and off the 
field, and the consequences of this for the rest of the W A Football industry, is the most 
pressing issue facing newly elected WA Football Commission chairman Neale Fong 
and his new look Commission." The continued losses and salary cap breaches led to 
both the AFL and the Commission expressing concerns about the FFC Board, In 
August 2001, a report prepared for the AFL Commission by its Geiteral Manager of 
Football Operations Andrew Demetriou became public. It made some scathing 
criticisms of the FFC and the W AFC. It expressed strong concerns about the state of 
Football in Western Australia and in particular the FFC board. The conclusions of 
Demetriou's report were strong! y critcised by the W AFC and the Chaitman of the FFC 
(Wilson & Duffield, 2001, p. 64). By 2002, the WAFC Chief Executive Officer was 
attending FFC board meetings. This followed on from a WAFC investigation of the 
events surrounding the FFC's breach of the AFL's salary cap regulations. By this time 
the Commission was less ambiguous about its views on the FFC. According to the 
W AFC Chainnan (cited in McGrath, 2002, p. 56) "when you make a $1.7 million loss 
[eventually $2.5 million] and are in disarray, as they were with salary cap problems, is it 
any wonder the Commission has someone there?" The effect of the AFL and the 
W AFC's 'concerns' in relation to the FFC were to be felt in changes made for the 2002 
season. For season 2002, the FFC had a new Chairman, new deputy Chari man, six of 
its eight member board were new appointments, a new Chief Executive Officer, a new 
Coach and a new Chief Financial Officer (Smith, 2002, p. 22). 
There are many circumstances that led to the financial and operational position that the 
FFC found itself in 2001. These circumstances included the inability to achieve on-field 
success, the burden of assisting the W AFC to service debt related to the redevelopment 
of Subiaco Oval21 and the cost of developing its own club and training facilities at 
Fremantle Oval. Despite the mitigating influence of these and other factors, the fact 
remains that the FFC has not delivered in the way that the Commission had expected. 
The Chairman of the Commission (cited in Lague, 2001, p. 60) made this clear by 
21 Between 1999 and 2000 the ground rental for Subiaco Oval increased from $950,000 to $1.65 million 
(Eakins, 2001, p. 58). 
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stating "our main revenue base is the two AFL clubs but at the moment it has been all 
West Coast, with nothing coming from Fremantle." The WAFC had not unreasonably 
expected the FPC to be making a positive contribution after several seasons. It is vital 
for the health of the entire Western Australian Football industry that the FPC is t>.ble to 
become profitable. The question of prime importance to this study that is left hanging 
over the entire FFC saga is whether the Commission appropriately exercised its 
authority to ensure the good governance of the FPC. The question has a basis in 
McGrath's (2002, p. 60) comments when he states, "the AFL is still not convinced the 
right people are there to ensure the Docker's financial viability." Even when the full 
variety of circumstances are taken into account, it remains the case that it was the clear 
responsibility of theW AFC to make sure that the 'right' people were running the FFC. 
The redevelopment of Subiaco Oval, the introduction of Peel Thunder into the W AFL 
and the entry of the FPC into the AFL were among the most significant decisions taken 
by the Commission in the 1990s. In particular, their significance can be found in the 
ramifications that they were to have on the Commission at the end of that decade. Their 
impact was to ultimately combine with other forces to bring about a period of instability 
and change in Western Australian Football administration not seen since the late 1980s. 
Chapter Four covers the fallout from these decisions and offers an analysis of their 
impact. 
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CHAPTER 4- CALLS FOR CHANGE 
Towards the end of the 1990s the Commission was beginning to feel the effects of a 
decade of decision making. With a constitution and membership designed to enable it 
to make the 'hard' decisions in relation to Western Australian Football and a 
management/leadership style to match, the Commission had to now confront the 
emergence of serious public criticism of its perfonnance emanating from both within. 
and outside the Football industry. The outcomes from some key decisions (covered in 
detail in Chapter Three) in combination with other events served to sharply focus'· 
attention on the Commission's perfonnance. These included: 
• A simultaneous poor onMfield performance by the WCE1 and the FPC and a 
continuation of the FPC's off-field problems. The impact of the poor performances 
led to a decrease in Commission revenues and the impact was felt throughout other 
areas of the Football industry; 
• The impact of the servicing interest payments on the debt associated with the 
redevelopment of Subiaco Oval on the Western Australian Football system; 
• A campaign of criticism led by WAFL clubs on a number of issues, the 
admission/continuation of Peel Thunder and the management style of the 
Commission being the most prominent; 
• A resurgence of supporters and Football identities voicing their disapproval with the 
Commission's performance and direction; 
• A State election campaign in which the Labor Opposition were calling for a public 
inquiry into Western Australian Football. Upon attaining office the Gallop Labor 
Government has made regular public comment about Football related matters; and 
• Widespread calls for changes in the structure and constitutional arrangements of the 
W AFC aimed at furthering the democratisation of the Commission and the boards 
of the WCE and FFC. The aim of these changes was to give the Football industry 
and club supporters greater scope to influence the appointment of persons to 
Football's key governing bodies. 
1 2000 was the first year that the WCE had not made the finals since 1989, although they have not won a 
premiership since 1994. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to provide further detail on the period 2000/2001. The 
chapter seeks to consolidate the impact of the issues raised in Chapter Three and to 
provide detail on recent developments that provided the momentum for the most 
significant period of change in the Commission's existence. The chapter includes an 
analysis of the significant criticisms that have been directed at the Commission. 
LA FORTUNA 
The study of the decline in power of institutions and leaders offers the insight that their 
fate is often attributable to a combination of factors rather than a single all 
encompassing explanation, although there is seldom total agreement on the causes. A 
study of the Commission in the period 2000/2001 tend1> to lead to similar conclusions. 
While in this instance the Commission's existence itself was never seriously questioned, 
there were many within the Football industry and State politics that were calling for 
major changes. The momentum for change had arisen from a combination of events, 
some more directly attributable to the Commission's own actions than others. As 
Machiavelli had so accurately observed in The Princi (Marriott, c. 1505/1958) 'Ia 
fortuna' can play a significant role in politics. Whether it was more the product of poor 
fortune or bad governance, the Commission seemed to be suddenly under 
unprecedented pressure from many quarters. While it cannot be said that there are 
many quiet and uncontroversial periods in Football politics, even by Football's 
standards this period was the most tumultuous in the Commission's brief history. 
Reflecting this changing mood in the Football community, Dr Peter Tannock, Chairman 
of the Commission since its inception, remarked in his final Annual Report (1998, p.2), 
••finally, the game has benefited greatly during the decade from the harmony, stability 
and unity that has generally marked the relationships between all the major 'players'. 
The continuation of this stability and unity is absolutely vital for the future of the 
game." Events were to unfold that were to place tremendous strain on the Football 
industry's ability to suppress the conflicts that were arising. 
As is the case with governments, it is far more difficult for c:iticisms to make an impact 
if key result areas show the government \o be perfonning well. For example, when the 
1 For example see Chapter 25 'What Fortune Can Effect in Human Affairs, And How to Wil.hstand Her.' 
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Howard Federal Government faced an election in 2001 it entered the election with 
world leading economic growth, low inflation, a growing export sector and record low 
interest rates. Its skills as an economic manager were widely acknowledged, even if 
other areas of its performance were far more questionable. Prime Minister Howard was 
seen as performing well in many of the areas that count3• The application of this 
political dynamic to the Commission is that although there have been legitimate 
questions about its performance across the range of its responsibilities for many years, 
to most Football supporters the situation was not apparent until both Western Australian 
based AFL teams were perfonning badly at the same time. All of a sudden, the most 
apparent health test of Western Australian Football indicated that something major was 
wrong. This added enormous impetus to the public perception that the Commission was 
performing poorly and in the need to apportion blame it was the most obvious target. 
As stated by McGlue (200 1, p. 6): 
When the teams are winning [the WCE and the FFC] most people don't give 
a second thought to the management and control structures but when both 
sides are swinging the handbag at the same time, you'll find dissension and 
scapegoats chasing on the rise. And what better targets than the group of 
businesspeople who control footy in Western Australia through their 
membership of the elite boards? 
However, on proper reflection, of all the arguments that were used to criticise the 
Commission, the on-field performance of the WCE and the FFC ought to carry the least 
weight. The WCE had made the finals every year between 1990 and 1999, although 
realistically the team had not been a legitimate premiership contender since probably 
1996. The ability to sustain superior perfonnance in the AFL with its salary cap, draft, 
travel requirements and competitive intensity, has proved to be an elusive goal in the 
modem era. The notion that the WCE would be a permanent fixture in the AFL finals is 
an unrealistic expectation even with the WCE's relatively well performed 
administration. As a result of the WCE lower on-field performance, for the first time 
the Commission had to confront diminishing returns from WCE royalties4• 
3 This is an observation about the importance of economic data in election campaigns; it is not an 
endorsement of the primacy attached to such data. 
4 Poor on-field performance typically translates into lower attendances and a decline in membership 
numbers -both of which occurred at the WCE. 
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This may not have been as critical had the Commission's diversification strategy of 
establishing the FFC borne fruit. However, as described in Chapter Three, for a range 
of reasons, including the Commission's own governance, the FFC was not in a position 
to help fill the void created by the WCE's drop in revenue. According to WAFC Chief 
Executive Officer Wayne Bradshaw (cited in Lewis, 2002, p. 64), "while West Coast 
have bee!~ fantastic in meeting their obligations, their returr. wasn't up to projections, 
while Fremantle just didn't meet expectations." From the Commission's point of view 
the poor performance of both of its AFL teams could scarcely have occurred at a more 
inopportum: time. Faced with the needs to generate cash to meet interest payments on 
its increased debt5, the Commission was now receiving less than expected revenue. 
This Jed to a reduction in the funds that the Commission was able to redistribute to other 
areas of the Football industry. In 2002, the WAFL's budget was reduced by $715,000 
and the Football Development Trust's by approximately $300,000. The reduction in 
Coaching and Management Grants6 to W AFL clubs still resenting the introduction of 
Peel Thunder was not well received. The reliance on the WCE and FFC to produce 
adequate revenues to support the Western Australian Football system continues to be a 
major concern, a point acknowledged by the current W AFC Chainnan Dr Neale Fong: 
Our revenue for footy is so narrow and so tied to the success of our AFL 
clubs. That puts a huge responsibility on West Coast both administration-
wise and team-wise, because it is actually funding a lot of football. When it 
doesn't go well we've got less funds. The challenge is to get Fremantle up 
to where it is providing revenue for the game (cited in McGrath, 2002, p. 
54). 
If the reduction of the Commission's earnings had been entirely attributable to the 
cyclical nature of the competitiveness of its two AFL teams, then there would have been 
less criticism directed at its performance. However, the FFC was not suffering a 
cyclical decline in perfonnance, it had yet to live up to expectations after seven years in 
the AFL competition and the Commission could not claim to be a totally innocent 
bystander in this regard. The financial well being of the Commission would be further 
eroded by the consequences of events described in the introduction to this chapter. In 
5 See Chapter Three. 
6 In 2002 each W AFL's clubs Coaching and Management Grant was reduced from $263,000 to $210,000 
and $238,000 was cut from theW AFL 's central administration (Lewis, 2002, p. 64). 
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2001, Western Australian Football incurred a ran-ge of extraordinary costs. These 
included: 
• The costs of contract settlements with the coach of the WCE (tenninated after the 
WCE poor performances in 2000/2001) and WAFC Chief Executive Officer Jeff 
Ovens (resigned as a result of pressure from Football stakeholders, principally from 
W AFL clubs) ; 
• The salary costs for the interim FFC coach to replace the coach sacked mid-season; 
• The expense of the Crawford and McCusker Reports; and 
e Provision for legal expenses in relation to the anticipated court action involving the 
exclusion of Peel Thunder from the W AFL competition in 2002 7 • 
The total cost of these extraordinary items amounted to $1.135 million (Duffield, 2001, 
p. 60). Again, it should be emphasised that it is not appropriate to place the 
responsibility for all these costs directly on the Commission, nor is it being argued that 
all of the above costs could have or should have been avoided. Conclusions about the 
Commission's role will be drawn in Chapter Five. The point of the above is to 
emphasize that at a time in its existence when the Commission needed every dollar it 
could find it was facing declining revenues and extraordinary costs and this provided 
fertile ground for those seeking to make changes to the Commission. 
THE DEMAND FOR A VOTE 
A number of groups were agitating for change at the Commission in 2000/2001. These 
groups included the Labor Opposition (and after the February 2001 State Election the 
Gallop led Government) the majority of W AFL clubs8, the Freo MOB9 and a lobby 
group led by prominent lawyer Marcus Ahern10• As would be expected, there was not 
total agreement among all concerned about what should be changed and how and why. 
One of the consistent demands from the various parties was for changes to be made to 
7 Legal action did not proceed (see Chapter Three). 
8 Represented by theW AFL 's Council of Presidents. 
9 The Freo MOB (Members Own Board) is a lobby group concerned with the governance of the FFC. 
Their major demand is that FFC members be given voting rights to elect FFC board members. 
10 The lobby group also included former FFC coach Gerard Neesham, ex-players Haydn Bunton, Bruce 
Monteath and Ben Allan, WAFL club presidents Brian Lawrence and Len Hitchen, former 
parliamentarian Ron Edwards and sports journalist George Grjlusich (Eakins, 2000, p. 72). 
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the method of appointment for Commissioners. As has been described in previous 
chapters the constitutional amendments that established the Commission granted the 
Commission strong powers. The ability to exercise these powers was enhanced by 
making it diff1cult for Football's stakeholders to derail the Commission from its course 
by voting11 to remove Commissioners opposed to their interests. The Commission (at 
the insistence of the Government) was granted the authority and the immunity it needed 
to put Western Australian Football back on a secure footing. Such arrangements may 
be acceptable in the short term, for example, we have seen assemblies implement laws 
during times of war and crisis that would not pass in more normal circumstances. 
However, in the long term, such arrangements were unlikely to sit comfortably within a 
society that generally embraces the concept of having their say in the election of office 
holders. In reflecting on the overall performance of the Commission the former Minister 
for Sport and Recreation remarked: 
I think first of all the big problem for the Commission was always going to 
be down the track, five, six, seven, years after. After they had jumped over 
the hurdles and knocked over the obstacles that they initially had to get over 
there was always going to be the problem of democracy .... It was always 
going to be a problem; it was recognised at the time. However, there were 
bigger fish to fry, bigger problems to deal with. The important thing was 
that the Commission was set up in an independent way so that they could 
make those tough and to some degree unpopular decisions (Edwards, July 
11 2002). 
However, in 2001 it was the State Government itself that was one of the groups calling 
for change. A point not lost on Gerard Neesham (2001, p. 63) who claimed, "the 
present W AFC only exists due to the patronage of the State Government. It is time for 
Geoff Gallop and Allan Carpenter [current Minister for Sport and Recreation] to 
implement their election mandate and introduce positive change, including new 
personnel to WA Football." The lobby group of which Neesham and Ahem were 
members had succeeded in placing the future of Football on the 2001 State election 
agenda. As Eakins (2000, p.72) reported "the committee will vigorously encourage the 
football industry and all football supporters to support whichever political party and 
whichever candidates at the next State election produce the most appropriate football 
11 As was explained in Chapter Two, the Commission's Special Members (the WCE, the FFC and the 
WAFL Clubs) did not have the capacity to vote under theW AFC's constitution, only to exercise a power 
of veto. 
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policy." The move to make Football a partisan issue in the 2001 election campaign was 
something of a departure from the practice of the previous decade. 
The pressure for changes in the structure and election processes of the Commission led 
to the appointment of David Crawford 12 to review the provisions of the Constitution of 
the Western Australian Football Commission and to report and make recommendations 
in relation to its: 
• Ohjects; 
• Powers; 
• Relationships with its special members and associated leagues; 
• Governance of itself, its subsidiary organizatons (including the appointment of 
Commissioners and the Boards of the AFL Clubs) and the W AFL competition; and 
• Related matters of importance. 
Crawford's recommendations recognised the calls for voting rights for Football's 
stakeholders by endorsing a new election process. 13 The Report called for members of 
the FFC and WCE to be given voting rights to elect board members of their clubs. It 
also recommended changes to be made to the financial arrangements between the 
WAFC and its AFL clubs to grant the AFL clubs greater independence and financial 
incentives to grow profits. The Report's recommendations were generally well received 
by the Football industry, although the recommended changes did not go far enough for 
some parties (West Coast Eagles, 2001; Duffield, 2001, p. 60). According to respected 
Western Australian Football commentator Dennis Cometti (2001, p. 61), "Crawford is 
telling the commissil)n that the time has come to modify its role. That it needs to put its 
faith in the very elements that made its creation nece:;sary." Given that the WAFC itself 
had initiated Crawford's review and the momentum for the implementation of his 
recommendations, the Commission promptly moved to adopt the new election system. 
The decision to embrace the new voling structure was to have almost immediate 
consequences for the composition of the Commission. The new election system (sec 
11 Crawford had conducted a similar review into AFL operations in 1993 and had built his reputation as a 
corporate doctor (Lewis, 200 I, p. 56). 
n See Appendix 2. 
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Chapter Three) facilitated the rJppointment to the Commission of new members14 who 
could generate support from Football's stakeholders and virtually ensured that those 
strongly associated with the Commission's decisions of previous years were placed 
under strong pressure to leave the Commission. Among the changes to occur in the 
wake of the Crawford Report was the election of Dr Neale Fang as Chairman15 • Fang 
had been successful in generating significant support, particularly from the traditional 
W AFL clubs. Pong replaced former Premier Barry MacK.innon16 who had held the 
Chairmanship for three years (Eakins, 2001, p. 64). 
There can be no question that the voting structure adopted post~Crawford has made the 
Commission more responsive to its constituency. Whether the new election system has 
undermined to an undesirable degree the Commission's ability to act with an 
appropriate degree of independence is yet to be fully tested. John Fuhrmann, a long time 
Commissioner and highly experienced sports administrator, holds the view that the 
governance of sport is best conducted under a 'guided democracy' (Fuhrmann, August 2 
2002). Fuhrmann maintains the view that the governance of the integrated Football 
system in Western Australian will be best served by a Commission that is not beholden 
to any special interests. This view was also expressed by Crawford (2001, p. 3): 
It is important to recognise at the outset that the major stakeholders were 
unanimous in that there is a need for the continuation of an independent and 
strong Commission that is capable of acting in the interests of football in 
Western Australia and not be, or be seen to be, responsible to or aligned 
with any factional group or groups. 
Just how 'independent' an independent Commission needs to be is a major question 
confronting the future of Western Australian Football. It is premature to assess the 
longer-term impact of Crawford's reforms, but it would be inconsistent with Crawford's 
desire for an independent Commission if those aspiring to be elected to the Commission 
14 The new voting structure was utilised to replace retiring Commissioners in 2001 when Ross Kelly and 
Brian Beresford were elected to the Commission despite the fact at the time of the election the WAFC's 
constitution had not been fonnally aniendcd to reflect the new voting structure (Eakins, 2001, p.64). 
15 Football'.~ stakeholders do not directly elect the Chairman of the Commission; the position of Chairman 
is determined by the Commissioners. Nevertheless, it is clear that Pong's level of support among the 
WAFC's constituency was instrumental in him receiving the Commission's endorsement {Metropolis, 12 
August 2002). 
16 MacKinnon had been a Commissioner for seven years; he faced opposition from some WAFL clubs 
when he was re-elected in December 2000 (Duffield, 2000, p. 54). 
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can succeed by catering to individual interests. Given the vote weighting attached to the 
various stakeholders it is to be hoped that this will be difficult to achieve17• In the short 
tenn, Crawford's election reforms have contributed in part to paving the way for the 
removal of those from the Commission that were seen to be an obstacle to 'healing the 
wounds' inflicted in previous years. This is consistent with the preferred style of 
governance under the Commission's new Chainnan, an approach that many have been 
viewed as necessary to the restoration of a functional relationship among Western 
Australia's Football industry members and with the AFL (Metropolis, 12 August 2002). 
Th'~ dysfunctional impact of the conflict in the industry in 2000/2001 was recognised by 
Duffield (2001, p.57) when he states, "the question needs to be asked whether any 
football administration can claim to be successful while overseeing the levels of 
discontent and mistrust which exist in the football industry here [Western Australia]." 
For the time being, the conflict that characterised the administration of Football in 
2000/2001 has relented and this has at least enabled the Commission to focus its 
attention on Football's more pressing issues. 
Despite the Commission's implementation of Crawford's election reforms, not 
everyone is convinced that an element of democracy in the administration of AFL clubs 
is necessarily a good thing. Former WCE Chairman, Murray McHenry questioned the 
ability of members to select the best people and argued that open elections would lead 
to factions battling for control of clubs (O'Donoghue, 2001, p. 114). McHenry was 
certainly in no doubt that the WCE was a business and should be run as such. 
McHenry's comments must also be seen within the context of the structure of Western 
Australian Football, f\ structure that is inconsistent with the introduction of a totally 
democratic system. The structure largely reflects the WAFC's need to exercise control 
over all elements of Western Australian Football in order to ensure that the WCE and 
the FFC act in accordance with the needs of the Football industry in general and that 
their revenues can be redirected to other elements of the Football system. Crawford 
(2001, p. 9) recognised the historical basis for the structure: 
Much has happened since the current structure dictating the relationship 
between the Commission and the two AFL clubs was implemented. Whilst 
the structure then put in place was considered appropriate at the time, it 
L? The WAR.. clubs do not support the reduction in their vote weighting from 50% to 30% under 
Crawford's recommendations (Metropoli~. 12 August2002). 
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should now be regarded in that historical context and as such, is no longer 
relevant in today's environment. 
The structure of Western Australian Football referred to by Crawford has been 
described as having 'socir.list' characteristics (Fuhnnann, 2 August 2002). This is a 
valid observation because the structure has been designed in part to facilitate the 
redistribution of goods. R0venues generated from the activities of the FFC and the 
WCE are redistributed to other aspects of the Western Australian Football system. For 
example, under current arrangements eighty percent of the WCE's profits are paid to the 
W AFC. This is in contrast with most other AFL clubs, which are directly licenced by 
the AFL Commission because these clubs are able to retain their profits for their own 
purposes. According to WCE Chief Executive Officer Trevor Nisbett (cited in 
McGrath, 2002, p. 119), "if you're Essendon [another AFL club] and you make $1 
million you spend $1 million on your club. If you're West Coast and you make $1 
million you retain $200,000 and $800,000 goes back into football [in Western 
Australia], which is great for footy but means we can't do some of the things we'd like 
to do." The structure of Western Australian Football also ensures that the non-AFL 
components of the structure have a strong interest in the success and policies of the FFC 
and the WCE. A key role of the WAFC is to balance these interests, although this can 
be problematical because in practice the WCE and the FFC deal directly with the AFL 
on many matters18 (Metropolis, 12 August 2002; Nadel, 2001, p. 225). 
While the structure of Western Australian Football has enabled the Commission to 
control its assets for the benefit of the entire industry, it has also led to a curious status 
for 'members' of the FFC and WCE. On one hand members of the FFC and WCE 
cannot be considered to be shareholders because they are not equity participants. Both 
Western Australian AFL clubs are one hundred percent owned by theW AFC. Nor are 
they truly members of a club, because the FFC and WCE are not constituted as 
membership associations in the way that many other AFL clubs are19• The term 
'member' when applied to the FFC or WCE supporters in reality means 'season ticket 
18 For example, the AFL and the WCEIFFC supported the introduction of Saturday afternoon matches in 
Perth in the 2002 season. This placed such matches in direct conflict with W AFL matches, which are 
traditionally hela ,..,n Saturday afternoons. 
1g South Australia's and Western Australia's AFL teams licences are held by their respective state 
Fooiball Commissiuns, all other AFL clubs are licenced directly by the AFL. Mosl other AFL clubs are 
in essence 'owned· by their members who have rights under their respective constiiulions. 
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holder'. Their membership secures them access to home games and ensures that the 
revenue that flows from their attendance goes into their club's coffers and not to the 
AFL2o. 
The issue of Football supporters being given voting rights should also be seen within 
the context of the commercial forces for change in sport described in Chapter One. 
Authors such as Nadel (2000) have argued that since the mid-1980s the VFUAFL's 
strategies for growth have been focused on treating Football supporters as consumers 
('theatregoers') and Football has unashamedly been run as a corporation. However, the 
treatment of Footl:·nll supporters as consumers is inconsistent with granting them voting 
rights. For exarnpk .. :1~3t because a person consumes Coca-Cola, he or she does not 
expect to qualify to vott <'.~ 'ii·'. ,..,,lea-Cola Company's annual general meeting. The 
democratisation of Western Austmlian F.:~otball is connected to issues that go far deeper 
than simply giving people a say, it has developed .out of a crisis of who owns the game. 
It represents a tension between the competing forces of decades of tradition, which has 
been built on community, identity and being a part of something; the modem market 
forces of a sports industry that demands AFL clubs be run as corporations; and the need 
for Western Australian Football to be operated as an integrated system that redistributes 
income so necessary to enable the game to survive at grass roots and semi-professional 
level. The status of members of Western Australia's AFL clubs is an interesting one. 
They are not owners, nor are they truly members and yet as supporters in the tradition of 
Australian Football there is a strong cultural claim that they ought to be given a right to 
detennine who runs their clubs. 
Finally, it must be stated that even if both the WCE and FPC eventually have the 
presence of democratically elected boards, this alone should not be assumed to result in 
higher quality governance. The history of Football (both W AFL and VFL) is littered 
with poor administration by boards elected by members. It was, after all, member 
elected administrators that had overseen the financial crisis that developed in Western 
Australian Football in the 1980s. What will ensure higher quality governance is a 
20 The way in which gate revenue is distributed in the AFL means that member's receipts are retained by 
their dub and do not flow into general AFL revenue. This means that all AFL teams place a strong 
emphasis on maximising membership numbers. As a result, teams such as the Adelaide Crows with their 
large membership successfully capture the majority of the revenue generated by attendances at Football 
Park. 
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process which ensures that persons with appropriate skills and experience are appointed 
and that adequate oversight of such boards exists so that poor performing 
administrations are addressed in a timely fashion. This is the intended outcome of 
Crawford's reforms which seek to give members a voice in the election of board 
members, increase t;1e independence of the boards of the FFC and the WCE and to 
clearly specify when the Commission should be entitled to act to address poor 
performance. 
THE GOVERNMENT TAKES THE FIELD 
Given the public policy focus of this study it is appropriate to revisit the role of the State 
Government in Western Australian Football some eleven years after the establishment 
of the Commission. As described earlier in this chapter, the Labor Opposition and then 
the Labor Government played a prominent public role in calling for changes to the 
Commission. In the 2000/2001 period Western Australian Football had become 
something of a political 'football' itself. The cultural status and popularity of the game 
that had served it so well in its relationship with government over the decades21 was 
bc(!inning to prove to be something of a double edged sword. The increasingly 
instrume-ntal basis to the relationship between sport and government that had evolved 
throughout the ~ :rter half of the 20th centurt1 appeared to be in evidence in Western 
Australia. Ju.:.~ ;.~. -~t bad been perceived that there was political mileage to be gained in 
rescuing Football .t. •.he late 1980s (or at least avoiding an electoral backlash for letting 
it collapse), suddenly there appeared to be a perception that there were votes to be 
gained in publicly criticising the governance of Football. 
The Labor Opposition, sensing an opportunity to tap into disaffection with the 
Commission (promoting the widely held and perhaps accurate view that corporatisation 
was destroying traditional Football culture) and the 'crisis' created by the simultaneous 
poor performance of the WCE and FFC, announced that it would conduct a major 
21 Football has arguably enjoyed a closer and more fruitful relationship with the State Government than 
most other Western Australian sports. For example, Fuhrmann remarked on the significance of receiving 
$30 million in State Government funding for the redevelopment of Subiaco Oval (2 August 2002). 
n See Chapter One. 
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review23 into Western Australian Football. 1nt: overt politicisation of Football was 
generally at odds with the political status of Football in the previous decade. During 
this period State Government concerns with the 0Jttlmission had generally been given 
an airing behind closed doors, although from time to time the Government of the day 
took the opportunity to remind the Commission that its receipt of public funds were not 
entirely without expectations as to how they would be used: 
The rrum..,ter [The Han. Norman Moore 1 has advised that the State 
Government provides $803 000 to the Western .Australian Football 
Commission by way of a three year-year business agreement to conclude in 
2000. In return for this investment the W AFC has as one of its goals the 
priority of ensuring that the Westar [W AFL] competition is relevant to the 
community and that support for the competition is sustained (W APD, 26 
October 1999, p. 2632). 
During most of the Commission's existence it had enjoyed bipartisan support. 
Concerns such as those expressed by the Leader of the National Party that the 
establishment of the Commission wou!d result in a government takeover of Football 
that would be to the detriment of non-metropolitan Football were dealt with 'in-house' 
(Fuhrmann, 2 August 2002). Its relative absence from the political agenda had in the 
view of the former Chief Executive Officer of the W AFC, Jeff Ovens (cited in Eakins, 
2000, p. 72) been a good thing, "for a group of football supporters to have an opinion 
that suggest football would be better off by politicisation is naive in the extreme." 
Ovens knew that Football had relied on and benefited from the 'goodwill' of 
government since the Commission had been established and that this could be 
threatened by elements in the Football industry aligning their cause with a political 
party (Ovens, 3 July 2002). 
It is pertinent to analyse the contribution by the Government24 to the controversy that 
surrounded the WAFC in the 2000/2001 period. One of the major areas of contention 
has been the redevelopment of Subiac~ Oval, described in detail in Chapter Three. 
23 Although promoting the idea of a review the Government has never released its 'blueprint' for how 
Football in Western Australian ought to be governed or defined what should constitute an appropriate 
relationship between the Commission and the Government. 
24 Unless otherwise indicated for the purpose of this analysis the term Government applies to the current 
Gallop led State Government and includes its actions when in was in Opposition prior to the 2001 State 
Election. 
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Because of the State Government's $30 million funding25 of the redevelopment and the 
traditional role of government in contributing to sports infrastructure, it is not 
unexpected that this would be an element of the ongoing debate to receive Govef!lment 
attention. According to the Minister for Sport and Recreation, Alan Carpenter, the debt 
the Commission entered into is the biggest problem facing Football in Western 
Australia: 
It is clear to me that much of the present dispute at W AFL level between the 
eight 'traditional' clubs and Peel can, in fact, be traced back to the debt 
burden from the Subiaco Oval redevelopment .... Anyway it is clear that 
there is a need to address the issue of the Subiaco Oval debt to reduce the 
financial pressure on the whole football system .... Something needs to be 
done (cited in Lewis, 2001, p. 58). 
The Minister (cited in Aisbett, 2002, p. 5) has also quesi:ioned other aspects of the 
redevelopment of Subiaco Oval. In Aisbett's article he suggested that the public funding 
for the redevelopment had led to an excessive investment in the Oval. "We even 
thought Subiaco Oval had been over-capitalised by the $30 million of government 
money put in. That left football with a financial problem we are struggling with now in 
WA. But having said that it's a good facility." However, in a response to a question in 
Parliament, Sport and Recreation Minister Alan Carpenter appeared to suggest that the 
redevelopment did not create sufficient capacity: 
Over the years, this State has suffered as a result of the previous 
Government's ad hoc approach to sporting facility development 
[unfortunately this approach goes back much further than the previous 
Government] and its inability to make a decision. The decision about the 
redevelopment of Subiaco Oval has caused more problems than it has 
solved. It has created a huge debt for the West Australian Football 
Commission, which it is having great difficulty servicing. The State 
Government contributes $1.5 million a year for the principal, and the 
commission pays the balance plus interest. The oval's size has also created 
a problem in that it seats fewer than 50 000 people. Major international 
sporting events - such as athletics meetings, the Olympic Games and the 
Commonwealth Games - require seating for more than 50 000 peor-1e 
(W APD, 13 November 2001, p. 5400) 
The Premier has also commented on the Subiaco Oval redevelopment by calling for 
lower ticket prices and standing room only areas (Lewis, 2002, p. 10; Tickner, 2001, 
2.5 This funding commitment was entered into by the Court led Coalition Government. 
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p.3). Essentially the Premier holds the view that the contribution of public funds to the 
redevelopment ought to lead to a greater number of lower price tickets to make 
attending Football matches at Subiaco Oval more affordable. He also expressed the 
view that more affordable tickets would lead to an increase in attendances. While few 
would argue that Football would be better off if it had less debt to service26 and its 
admission prices were more affordable, there are certain inconsistencies in the 
Government's comments on the redevelopment of Subiaco Oval. On one hand the 
Government appears to want a large (50,000 plus) stadium capable of hosting a number 
of different sporting events other than Football and affordable admission prices. This 
would be consistent with a policy logic that would suggest a lesser contribution by 
Football and greater public funding for the redevelopment. On the other hand the 
Government has been critical of the level of debt theW AFC has entered into to provide 
a suitable venue for elite Football in Western Australia. 
Given the parameters surrounding this decision outlined in Chapter Three, it is 
interesting to ponder what other options the Government believed the Commission had 
available to it. The extent of public funding the Commission was able to attract relative 
to the capacity, cost and quality of facilities that had to be developed, inevitably led to a 
level of debt that would prove to be a significant burden in the short term. It is almost 
certain that the Commission would not have rejected additional public funding and 
preferred to borrow less money. As Jeff Ovens (cited in Eakins, 2001, p. ll) pointed 
out, "this $2.7 million annual interest payment has to be met and it leaves football with 
limited options and little room to manoeuvre." This is not to suggest that the 
Commission should not endeavour to make attending AFL matches at Subiaco Oval as 
affordable as possible. However, it must be accepted that the Commission has to be 
commercially free to set ticket prices at a level consistent with its responsibility to 
ensure the financial stability of Football in Western Australia. The ticket pricing issue 
again reflects the tensions that confront the Commission as it tries to hold together an 
integrated Football structure. As the beneficiary of substantial public funds the 
Premier's views on the Commission's pricing policies should be considered as 
ZG Debt levels are not the only cost pressures placing demands on the Football system in Western 
Australia to generate revenue. AFL average player salaries have increased by 50 percent since 1998 
(Duffield, 2002, p. 68). Parker {16 August 2002) also commented on the inflationary pressures caused by 
the AFL's highly competitive environment. This includes significant rises in costs associated with 
coaching and administration. 
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legitimate. As the owner of two large profit orientated businesses and a collector of 
revenue for subsidising other needy elements of the Western Australian Football 
industry the Commission is subject to other pressures. As McGlue has stated; 
The rapid commercialisation of the sport [Football] is a killer of a conflict 
for the commission .... The commission has struggled to identify who it 
serves in the community. Carpenter [the Minister for .Sport and Recreation] 
is indicating clearly that the millions in taxpayer funding received by the 
commission in recent years means its community role comes before swilling 
fine wines with the AFL commissioners (2001, p. 6) 
In the 1990s the Commission inherited the legacy of decades of poor planning by both 
Football administrators and successive State Governments. Faced with the pressing 
need to secure and develop a facility capable of hosting elite Football matches to a 
standard expected of stadia in the modern sports market it is difficult to identify what 
substantially different course of action was available to the Commission. Furthermore, 
it is likely that the burden of the debt entered into by the Commission will not be as 
significant as it may appear presently in the longer term. Even if the performances of 
both its AFL teams vary over time it is unlikely that the Commission will have to face a 
similar revenue drought to the one that occurred in 2000/2001 27• In the longer term the 
Commission will not only be in a better position to afford its interest commitments, but 
it will have secured control of an impressive stadium with $38 million of combined 
government assistance. Considering the position of Western Australian Football in the 
late 1980s that should be regarded as no small achievement. 
The Government also involved itself in the calls for greater levels of democracy in 
Western Australian Football. The Government has held off conducting its own review 
of Western Australian Football in order to be able to analyse the outcome of Crawford's 
inquiry. While the Minister for Sport and Recreation initially gave Crawford's 
recommendations qualified support, saying that they did not go as far as the 
Government would have liked (Duffield, 2001, p. 60), it seems in the end that the 
27 This is not to suggest that the WCE and the FPC will become permanent fixtures in the AFL 's top eight 
teams. However, it is reasonable to expect that in the future the FFC should move to a profitable trading 
position and that the WCE will remain profitable even in years of poor perfonnance. The keys will be a 
proportional reduction in the reliance on the WCE, a possible restructure of theW AFC's debt, changes tn 
the profit/revenue arrangements between the Commission and its AFL clubs and a new rev.!nue stream 
raised from selling the naming rights to Subiaco Oval to a corporation (McGrath, 2002, p. 115). 
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Government has come to the view that Crawford's recommendations were sufficient.28 
Within a week of the public release of the Crawford Report the Minister was less 
equivocal in his support for its recommendations in a letter to the Chief Executive 
Officer of the W AFC. In the letter he stated: 
All positions on the Football Commission should be spilled and a new 
coiTlllllssion elected through the model recommended by Crawford. This 
should happen as soon as is practicable, certainly within three 
months .... One of the mQst difficult things for an organisation to do is to 
face up to the need for change - to change itself. That review provides an 
opportunity and a blueprint for reform in Football in WA. It may be 
difficult for some people to face the need for change but it is clear that we 
do have to change things (cited in Duffield, 2001, p. 60). 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Minister may well be correct in his assessment, what is 
of particular interest to this study is the degree of involvement of the Minister. What is 
implicit in the Minister's comments is that he believes that the Commission has not 
done a good job and that those running it ought to move on. Again, this is indicative of 
the relationship between Football and government in Western Australia. It is difficult to 
envisage the Minister for Sport and Recreation publicly calling for the Western 
Australian Cricket Association or Tennis Association to make similar changes even 
though these bodies, like many other sporting associations, have benefited from public 
funding. Similarly, it is unlikely that the Victorian Government would issue such a call 
fc:: change directed at the AFL. It should also be remembered that it was a previous 
Labor government that had been instrumental in pushing for the constitutional 
arrangements that the Minister for Sport and Recreation was now so keen to change. 
Football in Western Australia has been conducted as something of a partnership with 
Government for a long period, although that partnership has no firm foundation. 
McGlue (2001, p. 6) captures the essence of the relationship, "Carpenter [The Minister 
for Sport and Recreation] has no ability to direct the coiTlllllssion and the clubs about 
what to do, beyond holding over then the threat to withhold funding when the hat comes 
rr:und next time." Does the Government's financial support of the Commission justify 
2& There has been no indication that any Government inquiry will proceed. According to Metropolis, 
(August 12, 2002) the Government came to the view that the Commission and its constituents were 
making satisfactory progress without requiring direct Government involvement. A key component of this 
'satisfactory progress' were the changes made to the Commission's composition and the new leadership's 
demonstrated ability to make changes. 
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it.s involvement in Football's affairs29 to the extent we have seen under the current 
Government? If the Government wants to achieve certain outcomes in return for its 
funding, how ought it structure and conduct its relationship with the Commission a.TJ.d 
would this be consistent with its policy approach to other sporting bodies? The answers 
to these questions and an overall assessment of the Commission's performance are dealt 
with in Chapter Five. 
29 The current Govemment has also been a strong supporter of retaining Peel Thunder in the W AFL 
competition and the Minister for Sport and Recreation has directly intervened to lobby Football 
stakeholders for its retention. At the same time the Minister has been in favour of giving W AFL clubs a 
greater say in the structure and operation of the WAFL competition. Given that the campaign to remove 
Peel Thunder has principally been led by the W AFL clubs there is a contradictory element to the 
Minister's actions. 
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CHAPTER FIVE- FINDINGS 
This study has sought to evaluate the success, or otherwise, of the State Government's 
decision to rescue Western Australian Football in the late 1980s when it insisted upon 
the establishment of an independent Commission to govern the sport. That decision 
' created a structure of governance that was to shape Western Australian Football for the 
next decade and raises important policy questions about the outcomes for the general 
public and the Football industry arising from the relationship between government and 
Football in Western Australia. The purpose of this chapter is to provide responses to the 
three major research questions posed in Chapter One. These are: 
1. Has the Commission succeeded in fulfilling the policy objectives for which it 
was established? Namely: 
• The return to financial stability of the Western Australian Football system; 
and 
• The transferral of control over Football from the W AFL clubs to an 
independent body. 
2. Has the Commission met its primary objectives regarding the governance of 
Football in Western Australia? 
3. Has government support for the Commission served the public interest? 
POLICY OUTCOMES 
The first research question posed by this study asked whether the Commission has 
succeeded in fulfilling the policy objectives for which it was established? One of the 
tasks of this study has been to identify those objectives. It would be an over 
simplification to suggest that the only objective that the Government was seeking to 
achieve was a return to financial stability of Western Australian Football. Such a 
narrow interpretation of the Government's actions ignores the historical and political 
aspects of the policy environment in which the decision was made and the implications 
that were to flow from the control structure that was put in place. It would be more 
accurate to suggest that what Government was seeking to achieve was a major change in 
who was running Football in Western Australia and that by installing a different style of 
administration it was the Government's view that this would lead to a higher quality of 
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governance for the sport. Responsible financial management was one of the intended 
outcomes that would arise from the change in administration, but not the only one. To 
understand the motivation of Government at the time, there is a need to revisit the 
unique nature of the relationship between the Western Australian Gover!!Jnent and the 
State's Football industry. That relationship has a long history characterised by 
cooperation and support and has generally acted to serve the interests of both parties. It 
is a relationship that shares a number of similarities with the general evolution in the 
relationship between sport and governinent in Australia. That evolution has been 
marked by growing commercialistion and the use of sport to achieve political 
objectives. The rescue of Western Australian Football by the State Government in the 
late 1980s reflected political realities that were based on the cultural and social 
significance of Football in the Western Australian community. 
The closeness between government and Football in Western Australia added a political 
legitimacy to the rescue that was to have a lasting impact on the governance of the 
sport. The sentiment underlying the decision to rescue Football might be best described 
as something akin to the reaction of a frustrated parent having to deal with a 
consistently unruly child. The closeness of the relationship between Football and 
government shaped the nature of the policy solution. In essence, the Government at the 
time had come to the conclusion that Football was not capable of effectively managing 
its own affairs. The Government insisted upon a Commission that was designed to give 
it assurance that Football would be governed on a more responsible and independent 
basis. This was essentially the Government's core objective. 
The Commission's structure was inspired by the need to safeguard the future investment 
of public finds and to protect its status as a major creditor through the Government's 
exposure via the R & I Bank. However, the decision to set up a structure to restore 
financial stability went much further in its effect on Western Australian Football. The 
sentiment underlying the Government's intervention also resulted in putting in place a 
Commission who's style of decision making (and to some extent the decisions 
themselves) was deliberately remote from the sport's traditional administrators. This 
remoteness or independence was seen as necessary for making the 'hard' decisions that 
were needed to achieve a turnaround in the fortunes of Western Australian Football. To 
a large extent, this degree of independence was essential to the Commission's ability to 
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implement change at a rate that would not otherwise have been achievable. As h:ts been 
described in Chapter Two, by the early 1990s the Government's policy appeared to have 
br.en successful and Football had recovered to the point of self-sustWnability. However, 
the structure that had been put in place and the leadership style associated with it that 
had been to a large extent the Commission's strength, was beginning to show signs that 
it might be partially responsible for the Commission's policy failures. 
The ability to adapt to a changing environment is an important element of success. In 
the case of the Commission, its ability to insulate itself, that is the constitutionally 
afforded protect<.on to act with a high degree of independence, persisted through out a 
period when much had changed in the Western Australian Football market place. This 
protection encouraged an atmosphere of disconnection from Football's traditional 
elements and it was arguably this style of governance that contributed to dissatisfaction 
with the Commission more than any other factor. From a government perspective it 
should have acted earlier to review the Commission's performance and constitutional 
arrangements. The 1993 Submission of the Review Committee to Examine the Structure 
of Football in Westem Australia to the Minister for Sport and Recreation gave a clear 
i.ndication that concerns existed at govemmerti level and yet no major refonns flowed 
from it. The fact that Western Australian Football did not have an adequate 'release 
valve' meant that eventually the conflict within the industry spilled over into the 
political arena in 2000/2001 and very few positives were ever likely to flow from 
making Football a partisan issue. 
In summary, the major criticism that should be directed at government is thm it allowed 
the 'child' it had helped to create to remain unchanged for too long. It was necessary 
for government to act because there were insufficient mechanisms for the Football 
industry itself to facilitate the necessary adaptations to the Commission's structure. The 
Government's objectives to achieve an independent structure to govern Western 
Australian Football and to return the sport to a sound financial position should be 
viewed as being substantially achieved1• However, the impact of the structure put in 
1 There have been some questions raised about the Commission's financial management crt!dentialli given 
the impact of tht!: debt entered into for the redevelopment of Subiaco Oval. However, any suggestion of 
comparisons between the financial state of We:.tern Australian Football in 2001 and 1988/89 should be 
rcgomlcd as highly dubious. 
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place tu facilitate those objectives, also contributed to an unhealthy degree of conflict in 
the Western Australian Football system that could have been more readily resolved had 
adequate mechanisms been put in place. The policy fai\ure by government was to not 
establish a satisfactory review m~chanism to facilitate an evolution in the Commission's 
structure that was consistent with the changes in the FootbaU industry that took place 
throughout the 1990s. The Commission retained a structure that allowed it to act too 
independently for too long, the robustness of its independence should have been 
reduced sooner. With the benefit of hindsight, Crawford's refonns were several years 
overdue. It should be emphasised that the actual decisions taken by the Commission did 
not in themselves justify government intervention. It was not as though the Commission 
was so poor in its performance that this in itself necessitated government action. It 
certainly was not failing to fulfil its basic obligations. However, a break down in 
crucial relationships and a lack of trust can be as damaging to good governance as poor 
policy decisions. Ultimately it was the style of decision making encouraged by the 
Commission's structure !l1at was more responsible for dissatisfaction with its 
performance than any other single factor. Government has been closely involved in the 
establishment of the Commission. This was not a case of relying on arguments that 
government should not interfere with the administration of sport, it had already done so. 
Government should have recognised its responsibility to facilitate changes designed to 
achieve measured reform in the structure of Western Australian Football and for policy 
settings to keep pace with the significant changes that had taken place in the Western 
Australian Football industry. 
In summary it can be asserted that the Government's policy objectives underlying the 
establishment of rile Commission were achieved. However, a more strategic Long term 
view of the Football industry could have been adopted, which would have seen the 
Govemmelll take a more active role in seeking to adjust the Commission's 
constitutional arrangements as the policy environment shifted considerably through the 
1990s. Such an adjustment would have acted as a preventative measure to the conflict 
that arose ill the 200012001 period. 
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THE PERFORMANCE OF THE COMMISSION 
The second major research question posed by this study asks about the performance of 
the Commission itself in terms of its own objectives2• The Commission's first objective 
calls upon it to maintain the W AFL as an elite and successful competition. This 
objective recognises the WAFL's foundational role in Western Australian Football and 
was designed to protect the W AFL's interests in the face of Western Australia's entry 
into the national competition. This has proved to be a major challenge for the 
Commission. There has been a major shift in Western Australia towards the AFL 
competition in tenns of revenue, membership, attendance, sponsorship and media 
interest. This inevitable shift has confined theW AFL to a lesser position in the State's 
Football hierarchy, a position that has resulted in a degree of reliance on funds 
redistributed by the Commission. The W AFL currently exists at a level of 
'professionalism' that is not supported by the market in which it operates. 
The Commission, having aL·_cpted that the W AFL must undergo significant 
readjustment to find a suitable niche in the Football market, sought to relocate the 
WAFL competition to a more sustainable position. These adjustments, among other 
things, involved the introduction of Peel Thunder (which is discussed in detail below) 
and the introduction of 'host club' arrangements whereby FFC and WCE interstate 
recruits were. placed at one WAFL club3• It has been argued that these 'adjustments' 
acted to the detriment of the status of the W AFL competition and undermined its 
integrity. Until recently the Commission's decisions have reflected a bias for placing 
other elements of the Football industry ahead of the WAFL's interests. Given the 
prominence attached to the status of the WAFL in the Commission's constitution, it is 
open to conclude that the Commis~ion did not do enough to maintain the 'elite' nature 
of the W AFL competition. Resource and policy decisions of this period reflected the 
Commission's view regarding the role of the WAFL in the Western Australian Football 
l Exactly what constitutes the objectives of the Commission is open to some interpretation (sec 
commentary in Chapter One). This study hns selected the first two objectives in the Commission's 
constitution (WAFC, 1989, pp. 3-7). Firstly, "to promote, develop, control, ma1;age and encourage 
football matches and competitions in and out of WA with the aim of maintaining the West Australian 
Leazue a:. an elite and successful competition." Second, ''to provide guidance, planning, .control and 
leadership to the football industry and for the benefit of the public." 
3 The WCE's players were initially placed 111 the Claremont Football Club and subsequently the East 
Perth Football Club. The FFC's players were ul\ocated to South Fremant\e Football Club. In 2002 the 
host club arrangements were abandoned. 
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market. One of the major shifts that accmnpanied the changes to the Commission's 
composition in the 2000/2001 period was the emergence of a different view about the 
role the WAFL should occupy. The current Commission is supportive of devoting 
greater resources to the W AFL 4• This is consistent with the Commission's view that the 
W AFL competition plays a major role in the development of young Footballers and 
providing a high standard competition for retaining the great majority of senior players 
that do not progress to AFL level. Despite the current Commission's desire to raise 
standards in the W AFL competition it is severely constrained in its ability to do so due 
to lack of funds. 
In the absence of a murked shift in the ability of W AFL clubs to generate their own 
revenues or a major change in the way the AFL's rules reflect its view's on state based 
competitions5, the reality is that to a large extent the elite nature of the WAFL 
competition and its success will rely upon the size of the Football revenue 'pie' and the 
size of the 'slice' the Commission is prepared to allocate to the W AFL. Just as 
governments are frequently confronted by requests for resources that exceed their 
revenue generating ability, so too the Commission must make resource allocation 
judgements about what is in the best interest of the entire Western Australian Football 
system. These types of decisions frequently hinge on the priorities of the incumbent 
decision makers. Until recently the Commission placed a lesser priority on the W AFL 
competition and a greater emphasis on its AFL teams and Football development 
activities. While it will always be difficult to argue about degrees of priority, the 
Commission should be accountable to its constitutional objectives and it is in this light 
that the current stance of the Commission must be seen as being more consistent with its 
obligations. 
To highlight the Commission's performance in relation to its second objective, this 
study chose to detail three ·.::ritical strategic decisions taken by the Commission in the 
1990s. The redevelopment of Subiaco Oval represented the single greatest financial 
commitment made by the Commission. Chapter Three covered the planning shortfalls 
4 Both the Fang and McAullay Reports advocated a more prominent role for theW AFL. 
s. For example, under the current arrangements players can be drafted into the AFL after having played 
just one game with a WAFL club. This means that the majority of the cream of Western AustraliaJJ 
Football talent is drafted into the AFL before participating for a period in theW AFL competition. 
81 
of both the State Government and Football administrators that led to the circumstances 
the Commission confronted in the 1990s. While there has been undoubted short tenn 
pain inflicted on the Western Australian Football industry by the debt entered into by 
the Commission to redevelop Subiaco Oval, this study concludes that the Commission 
decision to proceed with the redevelopment was consistent with its obligations to 
provide for the long term well being of the game. Within a relatively short time frame 
'Vestern Australian Football will have gone from having no control over its principal 
aHsets to having secured virtual ownership of a modern stadium capable of servicing 
Football's need into the future and will have done so with the aid of $38 million in 
govemment assistance. While there may be some merit to the criticism that the 
development proceeded too rapidly, this pales into insignificance when the size of the 
achievement and its long tenn benefits are properly considered. 
The introduction of Peel Thunder into the W AFL competition in 1997 was also 
examined in detail in Chapter Three. This decision, more than any other, underpinned 
an extended period of poor relations between the W AFL and the Commission. One of 
the major factors underlying the Commission's decision to establish Peel Thunder was 
the perceived need to base W AFL teams away from their traditional inner city locations 
and place them in areas of population growth to attract junior players to Football. The 
Fang Report rejected this reasoning, arguing that it was not necessary for teams to be 
located in an area in order for that area to be adequately serviced in relation to junior 
player development. This study finds that the logic adopted by the Commission was 
sound and although there may be other reasons why Peel Thunder should not have been 
admitted to theW AFL competition, this was not one of them. 
The Commission's major problem with the introduction of Peel Thunder is that it could 
not generate a genuine consensus among the WAFL for its admission to the 
competition. As a result, the establishment of Peel Thunder had serious flaws from the 
outset brought about by the high degree of compromise made by the Commission to 
secure sufficient support from the majority of other WAFL clubs. Peel Thunder was not 
adequately resourced and as a result its on-field and off-field perfonnance has been 
poor. This in turn has made Peel Thunder an easy target for its detractors. The licence 
granted to Peel Thunder has been the subject of constant speculation as to whether it 
was temporary or the same as every other WAFL club's. To introduce a team into the 
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competition that has a different status from the others simply does not make sense and 
has added to Peel Thunder's inability to plan for the long terrn when it faces the almost 
annual prospect of omission. Although the Commission took the view that a 
compromised Peel Thunder was better than no Peel Thunder at all, this study concludes 
that the compromises were too great. If the Commission could not have generated 
sufficient support for the concept it should have delayed the introduction of an 
additional licence to compete in theW AFL until an acceptable level of support could be 
attained or merger activity facilitated further rationalisation. Ironically, the Commission 
still finds itself in this position in 2002. While the logic that underpinned the 
introduction of Peel Thunder should be supported, its implementation has been flawed. 
Regardless of the merit& of the decision to admit Peel Thunder to the competition the 
fact is that the Commission still needs to resolve the issue prior to the 2004 season. 
Should Peel Thunder remain in the competition and what process should be followed to 
decide the issue? The first point to be made is that it is unfortunate that the fate of Peel 
Thunder largely rests in the hands of the other W AFL clubs. Under the W AFC 
Constitution it is the vote of the 'traditional' WAFL clubs that decides whether Peel 
Thunder can continue to participate in the WAFL competition6. While the views of the 
'traditional' W AFL clubs ought to be taken into account there is a massive degree of 
self-interest involved in the position the clubs have taken. This situation clearly calls 
for the overall leadership role for which the Commission was established. 
This study concludes that the path taken by the McCusker Repmt offers the best way 
forward. Although it is notoriously difficult to reach agreement on the criteria that 
should be used to assess the well being of a Football club and even harder to gain an 
accurate assessment of where they stand in relation to that criteria, the way forward 
should be based on an objective assessment. It would be disastrous to fight a long and 
expensive legal battle to exclude Peel Thunder from the WAFL competition in 2004 if 
one or more of the other W AFL clubs is not in a sustainable position in the short to 
medium term. An objective assessment based on the current and future well being of 
each of the W AFL clubs ought to be used as the basis for decisions about the future 
structure of the competition, including the fate of Peel Thunder and possible mergers. 
~ :See ih.: results of the 2002 vote to exclude Peel Thunder in Chapter Three. 
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The FFC has enjoyed mixed fortune since it entered the AFL competition in 1995. On 
one hand it has made a significc.nt contribution to Western Australian Football in many 
ways and the merits of its introduction have never been seriously questioned. On the 
other hand the FPC has generally failed to live up to the on and off field expectations of 
its supporters and the Football community in general. This study does not 
underestimate the magnitude of the task of establishing a new AFL team. With the 
exception of the Adelaide Crows, the WCE (which were both new teams established in 
traditional Football cities with the enormous initial benefit of being the only teams in 
those cities) and Port Adelaide Power7, the history of the AFL suggests that new teams 
have taken a number of years to make an impression on the AFL competition. 
In addition to the normal challenges faced by new AFL teams, the FFC faced 
considerable player recruitment difficulties and the millstone of comparisons with the 
WCE8• Despite all of these challenges, by 2001 it was questionable as to whether the 
FFC had made satisfactory progress. As far as the health of the Western Australian 
Football industry was concerned the results of the FFC's administration9 had led to a 
less than desirable situation. The question of prime importance to this study is the role 
of theW AFC in the FFC's performance. As was stated in Chapter Three, this study 
does not advocate a role for the Commission in operational matters of the two AFL 
clubs it owns. However, the Commission retains the re~ponsibility, by virtue of its 
ownership and its ability to appoint members to the boards that do oversee the 
operational aspects of its AFL clubs, to act when circumstances require it to do so. It 
also is obligated to act to protect the overall interests of the Western Australian Football 
community. It should not be overlooked that the Commission was the only external 
body capable of addressing the problems at the FFC. Members of the FPC could not 
bring about change because they had no ability to elect board members; the 
responsibility to appoint appropriate persons belonged to the Commission alone. 
7 Port Adelaide Power was the second team to be admitted into the AFL from South Australia in 1997. 
8 The focus on comparison and rivalry with the WCE, which produces some positives, has also generated 
an unhealthy focus that has not always served the best overal\ interests of the FFC or the Western 
Australian Football industry in general. To some extent this situation was driven by the FFC itself. This 
situation has changed somewhat in 2002. 
9 Some of those interviewed as part of this study have suggested that it was primarily Football ov.:mtional 
decisions taken by the coaching staff and match committee that were responsible for the overall poor 
performance of the FFC, rather than poor administrative decisions. This is possibly the caxe. In any 
event, the FFC Board is responsible for the appointment of the coachin& staff and the key Football 
operations personnel. 
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It is acknowledged that there were obstacles to the intervention of the Commission in 
the running of the FFC. Not the least of which was the fact that the Commission was 
responsible for appointing the FFC board members in the first place. As was pointed 
out in one of the interviews conducted by this study, it is inappropriate to put a board in 
place one moment and the next be responsible for "cutting it off at the knees" 
(Fuhrmann, 2 August 2002). However, it is an equally unsustainable practice to allow 
under performance over an extended period of time without taking necessary action. 
Crawford (2001, pp. 9~13) makes several recommendations regarding the relationship 
between the WAFC and its AFL teams. Of key interest to this study is his description of 
the suggested basis for the redefinition of that relationship, which includes the following 
points. Crawford suggests a relationship that: 
• enables both AFL clubs to operate more independently through 
appropriately appointed Boards; 
• [is] free from day to day interference from the Commission; 
• [is] held accountable for achieving or not achieving agreed budgets, goals 
and business plans, with; 
• the failure to perform resulting in their independence being restricted. 
Crawford's point is essentially that there ought to be a pre-agreed poiilt at which both 
parties (the W AFC and the AFL team bm•rd) acknowledge that the Commission has a 
legitimate right to intervene. The historical lack of such an arrangement meant that the 
Commission faced considerable difficulty in establishing the basis for its intervention 
and hence it was delayed beyond a reasonable period of time. This was further 
exacerbated by a sense of loyalty to those the Commission had ap~'ointed to the FFC 
board and a breakdown in the relationship between the W AFC and a FFC suspicious of 
a Commission which was also the owner of its greatest rival- the WCE. The processes 
put in place by the FFC and WAFC that led to the positive changes that have taken 
place at the FFC in 2002 should be regarded, together with the implementation of 
Crawford's recommendations, as providing an appropriate basis for moving forward. 
The question many FFC supporters and many in the Football community in general are 
asking is why did it have to take so long? The Commission must accept its part of the 
blame for the delay. 
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It is acknowledged that the redevelopment of Subiaco Oval, the introduction of Peel 
Thunder and the governance of the FFC fonn an incomplete picture of the totality of the 
Commission's performance in relation to the second of its objectives under review in 
the study. Nevertheless, these three key areas provide a valuable illustration as they 
represent the most controversial and high impact decision taken by the Commission 
since its inception. The Commission has generally succeeded in providing guidance, 
planning, control and leadership to the football industry and for the benefit of the 
public. It has endeavoured to act in what it regarded as the best overall interests of the 
game of Football in Western Australia and comparisons with the state of the game in 
1989 and 2001 generally serve to portray a positive view of the Commission's 
performance. No organisation should be judged without due regard for the full range of 
parameters that constrain and complicate major decisions. Although this study has 
directed criticisms at the Commission's performance in relation to the implementation 
aspects o( Peel Thunder and the FFC it should be stressed that given the long tenn 
nature of these decisions, we are yet to reach an appropriate time period over which 
these decision should be more properly evaluated. 
The general consensus to emerge from this study, including that gained from those 
generally critical of the Commission, is that on balance, the Commission has served the 
interests of Western Australian Football well. There has been no serious suggestion that 
Western Australian Football would be better of without the Commission or that the 
achievements of the past twelve years could have been gained without such a structure 
in place. As Cometti (2001. p. 61) has stated with respect to his experience with 
Western Austt·alian Football in the mid~l980s, "let me share a secret with you. The WA 
Football Commission saved WA Football, no ifs no buts." The performance of the 
Commission has generally justified the decision taken by the Football industry and the 
State Government to create it. 
The Commission's major overall shortcoming was that it failed to adjust its approach to 
leadership as the Football industry changed in the second half of the 1990's. On the 
difficult and subjective question of the balance between independence and 
accountability, this study concludes that the Commission remained too 'independent' 
for too long. This in itself would not have necessarily been a problem. However, when 
this approach translated into a climate of mistrust and hostility, generated by poor 
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communication and lack of consultation, the Commission's critically important ability 
to generate support from its constituents was reduced. In simple tenns, the 
Commission's style was genuinely interfering with its ability to deliver on the 
substance. This is a pity on two fronts. Firstly, it reflected poorly on the Commission 
even though it had generally delivered well on the 'substance'. Secondly, had the 
'style' adapted more appropriately to the changing environment, there is a very good 
chance that the 'substance' would have been even better. Finally, the above comments 
should not be taken to be a recommendation for a Commission held captive by its 
constituency; the tail should not be allowed to wag the dog. In the short term, the 
implementation of the reforms recommended by Crawford should be a priority for the 
Commission provided the spirit of the reforms are adhered to. The Crawford Report 
demonstrates the benefit of the Commission subjecting itself to review from outside its 
own ranks. This should be a regular feature of the Commission's approach to 
governance and should greatly assist in ensuring that the Commission continuously 
adapts to its changing and challenging environment. 
ln summary, the overall perfonnance of the Commission must be rated highly. Its 
major shortcoming was the breakdown in the trust and communication among the 
Football industry's various elements. This substantially arose from a lack of 
consultation and a leadership style that did not sufficiently adjust from the 
'receiver/manager' mentality. The Commission was responsible for guiding Western 
Australian Football out of its most serious financial crisis and it has provided a solid 
platfoml upon which the iridustry can detennine its own future. 
THE PuBLIC INTEREST 
The final research question posed by this study was the issue of whether the State 
Governm~nt's support for Football has served lhe public interest? In posing this 
question, this study has acknowledged the very real difficulty that exists in defining 
what constitutes the public interest. To assist in answering this question this study has 
detailed the policy rationale for why governments in general provide funding to sporting 
organisations and documented the changing nature of the relationship between sport and 
governments in the twentieth century. It has also sought to establish the cultural and 
social significance of Football in Western Australia and how this affected the political 
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legitimacy attached to the Government's actions. The combination of the above factors 
Ie2ds to the finding that by assisting Football the Government is contributing to an 
activity that benefits both direcdy and indirectly a large portion of the Western 
Australian community. What the Football industry lacks in economic tenus, it makes 
up for in cultural a~;d social terms. It is an important industry, as deserving of the 
Government's support as many others. 
This study finds that the Government's support for Football is consistent with the policy 
rationale for government support for other industries and specifically consistent with the 
public interest arguments advanced for supporting sporting organisations in general. 
Government support has underpinned an activity that makes a very real, if somewhat 
intangible, contribution to the Western Australian community. What makes the case of 
Western Australian Football somewhat different is that the closeness of the relationship 
with the Government exceeds that generally found in relation to other industries or 
indeed other sporting organisations. This has led to some distortions in the usual 
separations that would generally characterize such a relationship. 
There are three aspects to the State Government's involvement with Football that have 
been evaluated in this study. Firstly, the decision to assist in the rescue of Football in 
the late 1980's and negotiate for an independent Commission to govern the sport. This 
study has concluded that this policy decision achieved its objectives, although its legacy 
was allowed to remain unadjusted for too long. Secondly, the ongoing support the 
Government has given over many years to Football, which continued after the 
establishment of the Commission. This support includes funds for theW AFL, the FDT 
and the redevelopment of Subiaco Oval. Thirdly, the current Labor Government's 
actions in the lead up to the 2001 election and since it attained office. The 
establishment of the Commission and the ongoing support for its activities arc 
consistent with the public interest objectives discussed above. However, the activities 
of the Labor Government are deserving of further attention because they go directly to 
an important sub-question arising from the public interest analysis offered in this study. 
That is, what should be the appropriate relationship between the State Government and 
the WAFC? 
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The distortions referred to above in the relationship brought about by the doseness 
between the Government and Football in Western Australia were never more in 
evidence than during the 2000/2001 period. As has been indicated in this study, the 
role played by the Government was to a large extent instigated by the inability of the 
Football industry to resolve its issues 'in house' (a situation significantly contributed to 
by the previous actions of Government). The conflict invited the involvement of the 
Labor Party in the heady atmosphere of an election campaign. Despite the pre-election 
rhetoric, the Labor Party's promised review of Football did not eventuate, due 
substantially to the Football industry's ability to resolve its issues without direct 
intervention from the Government. This reinforces the view that the role of government 
shoulrl. be to facilitate and enable industry to be successful (including the Football 
industry) and that where the situation offers sufficient justification, government should 
provide funding on a clear, coherent and transparent policy platform. According to 
former Minster for Sport and Recreation, Norman M.1ore (9 September 2002) "the 
Government's role in sport, in my view, is to support, but in no way provide specific 
direction or to be involved in the administration of sport." The Government's direct 
funding of the redevelopment of Subiaco Oval10, the conduct of WAFL games in 
regional centres and the FDT are all examples of where Government funding is linked 
to certain outcomes. In these cases the Government is entitled to expect that those 
outcomes are achieved and should require the Commission to report to its satisfaction 
on such outcomes. 
However, when the Government's involvement goes beyond an enabling role or the 
provision of specific funding attached to certain up front policy outcomes, there ought 
to be an element of extreme caution exercised. Despite its popularity, cultural 
importance and potential political significance, government should resist the temptation 
to directly involve itself in the governance of Football. That is not to say that the State 
Government is not entitled to express a view and that such views ought to be taken into 
account by the Commission. The funding relationship v.nd political realities demand 
10 According to former Minister for Sport and Recreation Norman Moore {9 September 2002), the 
Government's funding of Subiaco Oval was based on the Commission providing 3000 lower cost scats. 
According to Moore, this number was consistent with the Commission ability to service its debt 
obligations. Another condition that was attached to the funding was the requirement thnt Subiaco Oval be 
made available for athletic/main stadium purposes if events such as the Commonwealth Games were to be 
staged in Perth (Tannock, 2 September 2002; Moore, 9 September 2002). 
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that the Commission treat the views of the Government very seriously (Tannock, 2 
September 2002). However, the Government should limit its role to that outlined 
above. The task of running Western Australian Football is best left to a properly 
constituted and functional Commission. 
In summary, the Government's support for the Commission and Western Australian 
Football fits within the policy arguments advanced for government support for sport 
and recreation activities in general. Given the cultural and social importance of 
Football to the Western Australian community, Government support has served the 
public interesl by assisting tile of Football industry through a major financial crisis 
and, more recently, through the provision of funding for infrastructure, junior 
development and regional/community based initiatives. The unique closeness of the 
relationship betwee11 Government and Football in Western Australia should not be used 
by either party as a basis for distorting the policy pri11ciples that favour the existence of 
clear boundaries between the two bodies. These boundaries should assign Government 
an enabling role and one that is consistent wirh its policy approach to other sporting 
bodies. 
FuTURE CHALLENGES 
Football faces challenging times and in many respects the cost pressure and inequities 
that necessitated the major changes that took place in Football governance in the 1980s 
are showing signs of reemergence. Whether it is in the AFL, in State competitions such 
as the W AFL or in country Football, there are many Football clubs struggling for 
survival across Australia. As major changes take place in patterns of sport!ng 
participation, entertainment preferences and demographics of the Australian community 
the traditions and future well being of Football are under constant pressure. This places 
an enormous emphasis on bodies such as the Commission to get their decision making 
right. Football in Western AustraHa, as a result of the joint efforts of the Commission 
and the State Government, is at least in a position to control its own destiny. For better 
or worse, in the foreseeable future the well being of Western Australian Football is 
substantially dependent on the ability of its two AFL teams to be successful and provide 
adequate funding for the rest of the Football system. With this in mind, the 
Commission is working to both broaden and strengthen its revenue base (Fang, 30 
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August 2002) and this represents a critical component of the Commission's strategic 
outlook It must endeavor to secure arrangements that will provide it with access to a 
secure and growing source of funds and at the same time provide adequate incentive and 
independence for its AFL clubs. Having secured more satisfactory revenue generating 
arran.gements the Commission must then make sound judgments about how those funds 
should be redistributed. Those decisions will ultimately shape the future of semi-
protessional, amateur and junior Football in Western Australia. In the not too distant 
fuf.ure it is likely that more fundamental questions will be raised about the existence of 
the Commission and its role in the Australian Football system. The increasing centralist 
power of the AFL and the pressure to 'normalize' the ownership and operation of 
Western Australia's AFL teams are likely to be key factors in determining the future 
role of the Commission. 
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APPENDIX 1 -INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
Name 
Mr. Jeff Ovens 
Mr. Graham Edwards :MHR 
Mr. Phil Baddock 
Mr. John Fuhrmann 
Mr. Peter Metropolis 
Dr Helen Parker 
Mr. Michael Moylan 
Dr Neale Fong 
Dr Peter Tannock 
Mr. Norman Moore !\.1l...C 
Date Interviewed Position 
3 July 2002 Fonner Chief Executive Officer of the 
Commission 
II July 2002 
24 July 2002 
2 August 2002 
12 August 2002 
Former Western Australian Minister 
for Sport and Recreation 
Senior Consultant - Department of 
Sport and Recreation 
Fonner Member of the Commission 
President of the Subiaco Football Club 
and former Chairman of the Council 
of W AFL Presidents 
16 August 2002 Current Commission Member 
29 August 2002 Football Administration Manager 
Fremantle Football Club 
30 August 2002 Current Chairman of the Commission 
2 September 2002 Fonner Chairman of the Commission 
9 September 2002 Fonner Western Australian Minister 
for Sport and Recreation 
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APPENDIX 2- SAMPLE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. Could you please describe your background and involvement with West 
Australian Football? (Position, length of service, qualifications, etc.) 
2. What were the responsibilities/duties of your role? 
3. Please describe the circumstmces from your perspective that led up to the 
formation of the Western Australian Football Commission? 
4. What factors in your view influenced the government decision to support 
Football and what were the influencing factors/objective:-: of the Football 
Industry and Government? 
5. How would you characterise the relationship between government and the 
Commission? Are there any specific instances in which government has sought 
to have a direct influence? 
6. What were from your perspective the major objectives the Commission? 
7. What have been the major challenges faced by the Commission? How 
successful has it been in meeting these challenges? 
8. In retrospect what, if anything could the Commission have done diff,~rently to 
obtain better outcomes? 
9. How would you rate the overall health of the Football industry in Western 
Australian today and on what basis would you make those judgments? 
10. How did/does the Commission seek to deal with its various stakeholders and 
balance the demands of the interests that arise from its various stakeholders? 
11. Has the change in the make up and leadership of the Commission over the years 
influenced its policy directbn? 
12. Is there anythine that you like to comment on that has not arisen from my 
questions? 
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APPENDIX 3- W AFC VOTING SYSTEM 
Prior To The Implementation of Crawford's Recommendations 
W AFC calls for expressions of interest 
~ 
W AFC interviews applicants 
~ 
W AFC recommends successful candidate to special members 
FFC, WCE and W AFL 
~ 
Special members can either accept recommendations or veto them 
vote weighting- WCE 25%, FFC 25% and WAFL 50% - candidate must win 
more than 50% approval to be appointed 
Candidate Accepted If veto is invoked a second and if needed a 
third recommendation is made by the W AFC 
+ 
If third candidate is vetoed the Minister is 
decides on the appointment 
Crawford's Voting System 
Five person review committee formed 
~ 
Committee advertises for expressions of interest 
+ 
Committee makes recommendations to parties entitled to vote 
+ Voting based on House of Representatives system 
Voting Structure 
Current Commissioners 20% 
WCE 20% 
FFC 20% 
WAFL 30% 
The WA Country Football League 5% 
The Metropolitan Football League 5% 
1!0 
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